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I. INTRODUCTION 
Arlene Renteria was a thirty-eight-year-old who died in 2003 
from an infected bed sore.1  Ms. Renteria suffered from 
Huntington’s Chorea, a genetic disorder with symptoms including 
uncontrolled movement, progressive dementia, psychoses, and an 
increased risk for skin infection and weight loss due to the 
degeneration of nerve cells in the brain.2  She lived at Covina 
Rehabilitation Center from June 2000 to March 2003, when she was 
admitted to the East Valley Hospital emergency room.3  Her care 
plan at Covina Rehabilitation Center required the nursing staff to 
monitor her skin for signs of infection each day and seek physician 
treatment orders if any signs were found.4  Despite this plan, when 
she was admitted to the hospital, she had lacerations on her toes 
and feet, dark red squishy patches on her buttocks, a 
staphylococcus infection on her left hand, and redness on the skin 
of her lower back.5  Additionally, she was dehydrated from infective 
diarrhea, malnourished, and had vaginal bleeding and a small 
abrasion on her left minor labia.6  The infected bed sore on the 
sacral area of her lower back caused her death several months 
later.7 
Ms. Renteria’s heirs sued the nursing home and its parent 
corporations, for dependent adult abuse, among other causes of 
action.8  California’s Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 
1975 (MICRA) places a cap of $250,000 on non-economic damages 
such as pain and suffering in professional negligence cases.9  Prior 
 
 1. Sababin v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 266, 269 (Ct. App. 2006). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id.   
 4. Id. 
 5. Id.  
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 268. 
 9. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2(a)–(b) (West 1997); see also Bernadette Stafford, 
2
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to 1991, California trial lawyers argued that MICRA “markedly 
depresses the number of claims” against nursing homes and made 
“most nursing home cases ‘zero damages’ cases because the cost of 
litigation exceeds the potential value of the award.”10  
Consequently, personal injury attorneys were hesitant to take 
professional negligence cases that involved elder and dependent 
adult abuse.11   
In 1991, in response to this hesitation, the California 
Legislature amended its original elder abuse act, creating the Elder 
Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (EADACPA), 
which gives attorneys more incentive to represent clients such as 
Ms. Renteria’s heirs by increasing the remedies available for 
substantiated cases of abuse and neglect.12  Under EADACPA, 
plaintiffs must prove by clear and convincing evidence that a 
defendant is liable for neglect or physical abuse, and that the 
defendant acted with recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice.13  If 
successful, the plaintiff can recover attorney fees and costs, as well 
as damages for the decedent’s pain and suffering, in addition to 
compensatory damages.14  EADACPA excludes liability for simple, 
or even gross,15 professional negligence, which is compensated 
instead under the MICRA tort caps.16  Thus, the gravamen for an 
elder or dependent abuse lawsuit against a health care professional 
in California is whether the defendant’s actions are egregious 
enough to constitute elder or dependent adult abuse, rather than 
simple professional negligence.17 
 
Expeditious Efforts for the Elderly: Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court, 39 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 699, 708 (2006) (explaining several ways in which MICRA provisions 
restrict possible awards to plaintiffs). 
 10. Michael L. Rustad, Neglecting the Neglected: The Impact of Noneconomic 
Damage Caps on Meritorious Nursing Home Lawsuits, 14 ELDER L.J. 331, 371 (2006). 
 11. See Marc Hankin, The Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act 
(CHAP. 774, STATS. 1991), 26 BEVERLY HILLS B. ASS’N J. 18, 19 (Winter 1992) 
(noting that, after 1991, “it will no longer be cheaper to kill an old person than 
injure one.”). 
 12. Stafford, supra note 9, at 704. 
 13. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15657 (West Supp. 2010). 
 14. Id. 
 15. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15657.2 (West 2001); see also Stafford, supra 
note 9, at 713 (explaining that under the Elder Abuse Act, petitioners must show 
proof of a “reckless, malicious, oppressive, or fraudulent act” to obtain enhanced 
remedies). 
 16. CAL. CIV. CODE. § 3333.2(a) (West 1997). 
 17. The most insightful examination of the distinction between elder abuse 
and medical malpractice is Bryan Carney, Crossing the Line: Litigation of Elder Abuse 
Claims Hinges on the Distinction Between Professional Negligence and Actual Abuse, 30 
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In Sababin v. Superior Court,18 Ms. Renteria’s heirs appealed the 
trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the issue of dependent 
abuse after it found that there was no evidence that the defendants 
were guilty of more than professional negligence.19  In its 
unpublished opinion, the California Court of Appeal, Second 
District, Division 2, relied on the holding of Delaney v. Baker,20 a 
1999 opinion from the California Supreme Court.21  The appellate 
court reversed the trial court and held that there were triable issues 
as to whether Covina Rehabilitation Center’s employees were guilty 
of reckless, oppressive, or malicious neglect when they failed to 
follow Ms. Renteria’s care plan for maintaining the health of her 
skin.22  Because California’s Appellate Rule 8.1115(a) prohibits the 
citation of or reliance upon an unpublished decision, Sababin is 
unavailable to use as precedent as it had not been selected for 
publication.23  The court acceded to attorney requests to reissue its 
opinion as a published opinion, noting: 
This opinion was originally filed as a nonpublished 
opinion on September 13, 2006. We received numerous 
requests for publication that were well taken because 
attorneys and trial courts in elder and dependent abuse 
cases have struggled with the distinction between neglect 
and professional negligence. The requests revealed that 
attorneys and trial courts would benefit if we elaborated 
on certain points in our prior, nonpublished opinion. 
Rather than issue a piecemeal modification, we opted to 
grant rehearing on our own motion under California 
Rules of Court, rule 25(a), vacate the September 13, 2006 
opinion, and issue a new and revised opinion.24 
The Sababin court’s acknowledgment of the difficulty of 
parsing the delineation between professional negligence and elder 
abuse highlights the key policy issue in holding health care 
 
L.A. LAW. 42 (Oct. 2007).  This article is, in part, an extension of Mr. Carney’s 
search for the line, albeit from a plaintiff’s, rather than a nursing home defense, 
perspective.  While both plaintiffs and defendants may occasionally tactically 
benefit from an ambiguous line, the bar, the health care industry, and even the 
general public need to come to a general understanding of the difference between 
negligent and abusive medical care. 
 18. 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 266 (Ct. App. 2006). 
 19. Id. at 268.  
 20. Delaney v. Baker, 971 P.2d 986 (Cal. 1999). 
 21.  Sababin, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 268. 
 22. Id. 
 23. CAL. RULES OF COURT, R. 8.1115(a). 
 24. Sababin, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 268 n.5. 
4
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professionals liable for elder or dependent abuse in egregious 
cases: put simply, where is the line between negligent medical 
malpractice and reckless elder abuse?25   
This article contends that California’s appellate publication 
practices and the related prohibition on the citation of, or reliance 
upon, unpublished opinions interfere with the rational process of 
interpreting EADACPA to determine whether particular types of 
behaviors by health care professionals constitute elder or 
dependent adult abuse or neglect.  Four areas of analysis are 
necessary for understanding the impact of unpublished decisions 
on California’s elder abuse law: first, the enactment of EADACPA 
and the particulars of the Act;26 second, the California Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of EADACPA in Delaney as it applies to 
health care professionals;27 third, Delaney’s appellate progeny, both 
published and unpublished, where the California appellate courts 
have tried to implement Delaney’s distinction between professional 
negligence and elder abuse;28 and finally, California’s appellate 
publication rules, including their historical development and the 
2007 revisions.29  The article concludes with the suggestion that the 
California Supreme Court abandon its citation prohibition for 
unpublished opinions.30 
II. ELDER ABUSE AND DEPENDENT ADULT CIVIL PROTECTION ACT 
In 1975, the California Legislature enacted MICRA in response 
to concern that medical malpractice awards were making it difficult 
for physicians to afford malpractice insurance.31  The MICRA 
provisions include a hard cap for non-economic damages, 
specifically that  “[i]n any action for injury against a health care 
provider based on professional negligence, the injured plaintiff 
shall be entitled to recover non-economic losses to compensate for 
pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement 
and other non-pecuniary damage” and that “[i]n no action shall 
the amount of damages for non-economic losses exceed two 
 
 25. See Carney, supra note 17, at 42. 
 26. See infra Part II. 
 27. See infra Part III. 
 28. See infra Part IV. 
 29. See infra Part V. 
 30. See infra Part VI. 
 31. Delaney v. Baker, 971 P.2d 986, 992 (Cal. 1999). 
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hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000).”32  As an example of the 
application of the MICRA cap, in 2002, a diabetic nursing home 
resident was awarded $3 million by a jury for pain and suffering 
after he underwent a bilateral amputation due to substandard 
care.33  Despite the jury verdict, the court applied the MICRA cap 
and reduced the judgment to $250,000.34 
In addition to the cap on non-economic damages, MICRA has 
other provisions that curtail recovery against health providers.  
MICRA restricts attorney fees35 and prohibits recovery for pain and 
suffering once a patient dies.36  Another statute, Section 425.13 of 
the California Code of Civil Procedure, also impedes meritorious 
elder abuse actions by procedurally limiting punitive damage 
awards by requiring that plaintiffs obtain a court order prior to 
filing a claim for punitive damages.37  Plaintiffs must prove that 
there is a substantial likelihood of prevailing prior to being allowed 
to plead for punitive damages.38   
These remedy caps and procedural hurdles dampened the 
willingness of attorneys to sue on behalf of elder abuse victims.39  In 
 
 32. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2(a)–(b) (West 1997). 
 33. Rustad, supra note 10, at 372 (citing Ollison v. Eskaton Homestead of Fair 
Oaks, No. 00AS05801 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2002)). 
 34. Id. 
 35. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West 2008). 
 36. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.34 (West 2004); See also BRIAN BURWELL & 
EILEEN TELL, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., THE NURSING HOME 
LIABILITY INSURANCE MARKET: A CASE STUDY OF CALIFORNIA, 8 (June 2006), 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/2006/NHliab-CA.pdf.  
 37. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.13(a) (West 2004); see, e.g., Aquino v. Superior 
Court, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 477, 481 (Ct. App. 1993) (discussing the “procedure for 
the trial court to determine whether punitive damages may be alleged against 
health care providers in any action for damages arising out of alleged professional 
negligence”). 
 38. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.13(a); see, e.g., Aquino, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 481 
(noting section 425.13’s requirement that the plaintiff establish such a “substantial 
likelihood”). 
 39. Hankin, supra note 11, at 19.  Hankin states: 
Talk about attorneys’ fees may seem meaningless since frail abused elders 
and dependent adults often die before trial. Many a case failed when the 
victim died before damages were awarded. Fearing an expensive loss of 
time and money, attorneys usually declined to handle contingency cases 
of obvious and severe abuse merely because the victim was rendered so 
frail by the abuse that death might come before the damage award, 
ending the hope of a truly significant recovery. Defendants have, 
therefore, had every incentive to delay. No longer. Damages for pain and 
suffering will be recoverable even after the victim’s death, up to 
$250,000, if the plaintiff satisfies the tests for the recovery of attorneys’ 
fees. Contingency cases proving, by clear and convincing evidence, a 
6
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1991, EADACPA was passed by the California Legislature in 
response to lobbying by the Beverly Hills Bar Association and other 
advocates regarding the poor treatment of elders in nursing 
homes.40  The legislature made a number of critical findings as part 
of the legislative process, findings that later proved instrumental in 
interpreting the legislature’s intent in passing EADACPA.41  
Recognizing that elders may be “subjected to abuse, neglect, or 
abandonment,”42 the legislature desired to direct the state’s 
attention to this significant portion of the population.43  In 
addition, the legislature found that elders were vulnerable and 
dependent upon families or caretakers, putting them at a greater 
risk of abuse.44  Because of a hesitancy to take elder abuse cases 
caused, in part, by statutory limitations on damages, the legislature 
also saw a need “to enable interested persons to engage attorneys to 
take up the cause,”45 providing an incentive to potential advocates.  
Thus, the recoverable damages once restricted by MICRA became 
possible through cases prosecuted under EADACPA.46 
The legislature made EADACPA broad enough to cover 
situations where an individual over the age of eighteen is 
vulnerable to abuse and neglect.47  The statute defines the term 
“elder” as “any person residing in this state, 65 years of age or 
older,”48 but it also extends protection to dependent adults—those 
between the ages of eighteen and sixty-four with “physical or 
mental limitations that restrict his or her ability to carry out normal 
activities or to protect his or her rights.”49  Within EADACPA, 
“abuse of an elder or a dependent adult” is defined to specifically 
cover physical and financial abuse, abandonment, isolation, and 
 
reckless or intentional abuse of the frail are now viable. 
Id. 
 40. Id. at 18–19; see also BURWELL & TELL, supra note 36, at 8 (noting that 
EADACPA was enacted “following a series of studies on the quality of life for 
California’s elderly.”). 
 41. See Delaney v. Baker, 971 P.2d 986, 991–92 (Cal. 1999). 
 42. CAL.WELF. & INST.CODE § 15600(a) (West 2001). 
 43. See id. § 15600(b). 
 44. Id. § 15600(d). 
 45. Id. § 15600(j). 
 46. See generally Martin Ramey, Comment, Putting the Cart Before the Horse: The 
Need to Re-Examine Damage Caps in California’s Elder Abuse Act, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
599 (2002) (calling for the reform of EADAPCA damage caps). 
 47. CAL.WELF. & INST.CODE § 15600(c). 
 48. Id. § 15610.27. 
 49. Id. § 15610.23(a) (West Supp. 2010). 
7
Mead: Unpublished Opinions and Citation Prohibitions: Judicial Muddling
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2010
  
2010] UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS 213 
abduction.50  In more detail, physical abuse is defined with 
references to the Penal Code’s definitions of assault, battery, sexual 
assault, sexual battery, rape, incest, sodomy, and lewd or lascivious 
acts.51  In addition to the listed crimes, physical abuse includes the 
“[u]se of a physical or chemical restraint or psychotropic 
medication” as a form of punishment, for a period beyond what the 
physician or surgeon ordered, or using the medication without a 
physician’s order.52   
EADACPA broadly defines neglect as a caregiver’s failure to 
“exercise that degree of care that a reasonable person in a like 
position would exercise.”53  Neglect specifically includes: the 
“failure to assist in personal hygiene, or in the provision of food, 
clothing, or shelter”;54 the failure to provide medical or mental 
health care;55 the “failure to protect elders from health and safety 
hazards”;56 and the “[f]ailure to prevent malnutrition or 
dehydration.”57  The definition also addresses the need to protect 
elders and dependent adults from self-neglect.58 
Section 15657 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code 
is the key implementing section which expands the available 
remedies in order to fulfill the legislature’s goal of enticing 
attorneys to represent elders and dependent adults: 
Where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence 
that a defendant is liable for physical abuse as 
defined in Section 15610.63 [or] neglect as defined 
in Section 15610.57 . . . and that the defendant has 
been guilty of recklessness, oppression, fraud, or 
malice in the commission of this abuse, the following 
shall apply, in addition to all other remedies 
otherwise provided by law:  
 
 
 50. Id. § 15610.07 (West 2001).  This article intentionally excludes from 
analysis all forms of elder abuse except physical abuse and neglect.  While 
financial abuse is a significant problem in both California and the rest of the 
United States, it is different in both kind and form from abuse and neglect 
perpetrated by health care practitioners, with the possible exception of Medicaid 
and Medicare fraud. 
 51. Id. § 15610.63 (West Supp. 2010). 
 52. Id. § 15610.63(f). 
 53. Id. § 15610.57 (West 2001). 
 54. Id. § 15610.57(b)(1). 
 55. Id. § 15610.57(b)(2). 
 56. Id. § 15610.57(b)(3). 
 57. Id. § 15610.57b)(4). 
 58. Id. § 15610.57(b)(5) (West Supp. 2010). 
8
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(a) The court shall award to the plaintiff reasonable 
attorney’s fees and costs. The term “costs” includes, 
but is not limited to, reasonable fees for the services 
of a conservator, if any, devoted to the litigation of a 
claim brought under this article.  
(b) The limitations imposed by Section 377.34 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure on the damages recoverable 
shall not apply. However, the damages recovered 
shall not exceed the damages permitted to be 
recovered pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 
3333.2 of the Civil Code.  
(c) The standards set forth in subdivision (b) of 
Section 3294 of the Civil Code regarding the 
imposition of punitive damages on an employer 
based upon the acts of an employee shall be satisfied 
before any damages or attorney’s fees permitted 
under this section may be imposed against an 
employer.59 
Section 15657 requires that plaintiffs prove, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that the defendant committed abuse or 
neglect while acting in a reckless, oppressive, fraudulent, or 
malicious manner.60  This heightened burden of proof was added 
during the legislative process in response to opposition to 
EADACPA from the California Association of Health Facilities.61  If 
this burden is met, additional remedies are available, including 
attorney fees62 and non-economic damages with a $250,000 cap.63  
Punitive damages are permitted if the plaintiff can show that the 
defendant acted with oppression, fraud, or malice, or that a 
 
 59. Id. § 15657 (West 2001). 
 60.  Id. 
 61. Delaney v. Baker, 971 P.2d 986, 994 (Cal. 1999). 
 62. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15657.1.  This section states: 
The award of attorney’s fees pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 15657 
shall be based on all factors relevant to the value of the services rendered, 
including, but not limited to, the factors set forth in Rule 4-200 of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California, and all of 
the following: (a) The value of the abuse-related litigation in terms of the 
quality of life of the elder or dependent adult, and the results obtained. 
(b) Whether the defendant took reasonable and timely steps to 
determine the likelihood and extent of liability. (c) The reasonableness 
and timeliness of any written offer in compromise made by a party to the 
action.  
Id.  
 63. Id. § 15657(b) (West Supp. 2010); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2(b) (West 
1997). 
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defendant employer employed an individual with “advance 
knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or 
her with conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or 
authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages 
are awarded.”64  On its face, section 15657.2 exempts health care 
providers from liability for elder abuse and neglect for actions 
defined as professional negligence: 
Notwithstanding this article, any cause of action for injury 
or damage against a health care provider, as defined in 
Section 340.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, based on 
the health care provider’s alleged professional negligence, 
shall be governed by those laws which specifically apply to 
those professional negligence causes of action.65 
Unfortunately, the legislature did not define “professional 
negligence” within EADACPA, forcing courts to look back to 
MICRA’s definition for guidance: 
“Professional negligence” means a negligent act or 
omission to act by a health care provider in the rendering 
of professional services, which act or omission is the 
proximate cause of a personal injury or wrongful death, 
provided that such services are within the scope of services 
for which the provider is licensed and which are not 
within any restriction imposed by the licensing agency or 
licensed hospital.66 
The legislature also failed to define “health care practitioner” 
within EADACPA.  This has made it somewhat unclear as to whom 
the professional negligence exemption applies to under section 
15657.2.   
MICRA defines a “health care provider” as any person licensed 
or certified pursuant to Division 2 of the Business and Professions 
Code: licensed osteopaths or chiropractors, clinics, health 
dispensaries and facilities, and “the legal representatives of a health 
care provider.”67  In contrast, EADACPA defines two different 
groups having “care and custody” of elders and dependent adults: 
 
 64. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294. 
 65. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15657.2. 
 66. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 1997).  Not surprisingly, the same 
definition for “professional negligence” is used in California Civil Procedure Code 
section 364 and California Civil Procedure Code section 340.5.  CAL. CIV. PROC. 
CODE §§ 340.5, 364 (West 2004). 
 67. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3333.1–3333.2. 
10
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“health practitioner” and “care custodian.”68  “Health practitioner” 
includes specific professions: “physician and surgeon, psychiatrist, 
psychologist, dentist, resident, intern, podiatrist, chiropractor, 
licensed nurse, dental hygienist, licensed clinical social worker or 
associate clinical social worker, marriage, family, and child 
counselor,” and also includes the same broadly inclusive clause as 
MICRA: “or any other person who is currently licensed under 
Division 2 (commencing with section 500) of the Business and 
Professions Code.”69  Additionally, the definition includes medical 
emergency technicians, paramedics, psychologist assistants, 
marriage, family, and child counselor trainees, unlicensed 
marriage, family, and child counselor interns, coroners, and state 
or county public health or social service employees “who treat[] an 
elder or a dependent adult for any condition.”70  These 
practitioners provide medical and related services to elders and 
dependent adults.   
In addition to medical care, elders and dependent adults often 
receive varying degrees of care in day-to-day living tasks; EADACPA 
defines those responsible for providing such care as “care 
custodians.”71  The definition encompasses “an administrator or an 
employee of any of the following public or private facilities or 
agencies, or persons providing care or services for elders or 
dependent adults, including members of the support staff and 
maintenance staff.”72  Twenty-four types of public and private 
agencies are listed, including twenty-four-hour health facilities, 
clinics, home-health agencies, day care resources, state social 
services and county welfare departments, with an all-encompassing 
final listing of “[a]ny other protective, public, sectarian, mental 
health, or private assistance or advocacy agency or person 







 68.  CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.37 (West Supp. 2010). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71.  See id. 
 72. Id. § 15610.17. 
 73. Id. 
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The legislature left the relationship between sections 15657 
and 15657.2 unclear, perhaps intentionally.74  Specifically, it failed 
to address the issue of whether professional negligence was defined 
broadly enough to encompass all actions by a health care 
provider—as suggested by the MICRA definition of professional 
negligence—or whether there are certain behaviors that are 
egregious enough that they go beyond professional negligence and 
constitute abuse and neglect.  Further, EADACPA is unclear on 
whether all activities of a health care provider are considered 
medical in nature or whether a health care provider can also be 
independently responsible as a care custodian.  Judicial 
interpretation, starting in Delaney v. Baker, has begun to answer 
these questions.75 
III. DELANEY v. BAKER: HOLDING HEALTH CARE PRACTITIONERS 
ACCOUNTABLE FOR ELDER AND DEPENDENT ADULT ABUSE 
In Delaney v. Baker, the California Court of Appeal, First 
District, affirmed a jury verdict in favor of Kay Delaney, a plaintiff 
who sued the Meadowood Nursing Center and its administrators, 
Calvin Baker, Sr. and Calvin Baker, Jr., for the wrongful death of 
her mother.76  Kay Delaney’s mother, Rose Wallien, was a resident 
of Meadowood for about four months.77  Ms. Wallien, an eighty-
eight-year-old, entered the Meadowood facility in April, 1993, in 
order to receive skilled nursing care due to a broken ankle.78  On 
August 9, 1993, she died from infection caused by Stage III and IV 
pressure ulcers on her ankles, feet, and buttocks that she developed 
while at Meadowood.79  Her Stage IV pressure sores were deep 
enough to expose bone.80  Based on the reckless neglect of Ms. 
Wallien, the jury awarded the plaintiff damages for medical 
 
 74. See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 302 n.235 (2000) 
(“When members of Congress focus on a particular issue but fail to reach a 
collective decision about how to resolve it, they sometimes compromise by 
enacting intentionally ambiguous language that transfers the issue to the courts.”). 
 75. See Delaney v. Baker, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 645–46, 652 (Ct. App. 1997). 
 76. Id. at 646. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Delaney v. Baker, 971 P.2d 986, 988 (Cal. 1999).  
 80. See W. Andrew Arnold & Brian E. Arnold, Helping Society’s Most Vulnerable: 
Nursing Home Litigation, 14 S.C. LAW. 29, 32 (Mar. 2003) (“Stage IV is a full skin 
loss with extensive damage to the skin and underlying tissue, involving necrosis 
(rotting of skin) and may cause damage to the muscle and bone.”).  Stage III and 
IV pressure ulcers are evidence of significant neglect.  Delaney, 971 P.2d at 988. 
12
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss1/4
  
218 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1 
expenses, pain and suffering, and attorney’s fees and costs.81  The 
defendants appealed to the California Court of Appeal, First 
District, and then to the California Supreme Court. 
The key issue in both appellate court opinions was whether 
section 15657 of EADACPA was applicable to recklessly negligent 
health care professionals despite the language of section 15657.2.82  
The First District Court of Appeal held that health professionals 
could be held accountable under section 15657 despite the 
language of section 15657.2.83  It based its decision on the 
definition of “specifically apply” in order to determine which 
professional negligence laws MICRA limits apply to:  
The question, however, is whether section 15657.2 states 
that MICRA statutes shall solely govern or shall also govern. 
Appellants answer that the Legislature intended that 
MICRA alone should apply when the cause of action is 
based on the health care provider’s alleged professional 
negligence. Appellants’ argument implicitly assumes that 
the application of MICRA or EADACPA is an either-or 
proposition, but that both cannot apply in the same case. 
We disagree with this assumption. Section 15657 solely 
displaces statutes of general applicability, such as Code of 
Civil Procedure section 377.34, which limits the damages 
recoverable for a decedent’s injuries or death, and Code 
of Civil Procedure section 1021, which limits the recovery 
of attorney fees. EADACPA’s enhanced-remedy provisions 
do not conflict with any specific provision of MICRA.84 
More importantly, the First District noted that EADACPA was a 
remedial statute which should be interpreted liberally to preserve 
the legislature’s intention to remedy some of the evils of elder 
abuse and neglect.85  Thus, it concluded that its “interpretation of 
section 15657.2 respects the legislature’s intent by leaving intact the 
incentives created by EADACPA even where the cause of action is 





 81.  Delaney, 971 P.2d at 989. 
 82. Id .at 988. 
 83.  Delaney v. Baker, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 649 (Ct. App. 1997). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 650. 
 86. Id. (quoting CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15657.2 (West 2010)). 
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The First District’s decision in Delaney directly conflicted with 
the Second District’s opinion in Mueller v. Saint Joseph Medical 
Center,87 which held that EADACPA’s enhanced remedies in section 
15657 were excluded by section 15657.2 when claims were based on 
the rendition of professional services by health care providers, even 
if the providers acted in a manner that was recklessly negligent.88  
The Mueller court based this holding on precedent defining the 
term “based on” when it is used by the California Legislature.89  The 
First District rejected this holding, noting that “[o]ur colleagues 
reached this conclusion without analysis of section 15657.2 as a 
whole or consideration of the legislative purposes of the statutory 
scheme.”90  Presumably because of the split in the districts, the 
California Supreme Court granted the petition for review.91 
The California Supreme Court affirmed the First District’s 
decision, but with different reasoning.  Associate Justice Stanley 
Mosk, the author of the supreme court opinion, noted that there 
are three distinct ways to view the relationship between sections 
15657 and 15657.2: first, following the court of appeal’s approach 
and interpreting away any conflict between the sections;92 second, 
following the defendant’s proposed approach, which would 
“broadly exempt from the heightened remedies of section 15657 
health care providers who recklessly neglect elder and dependent 
adults”;93 and finally, the approach of “the amici curiae Consumer 
Attorneys of California (joined to some degree by California 
Advocates for Nursing Home Reform, Inc.).”94  The court adopted 
the third approach, but Associate Justice Janice Rogers Brown 
concurred in the result because she preferred the argument of the 
court of appeal.95 
 
 87. Mueller v. Saint Joseph Med. Ctr., 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 668 (Ct. App. 1997). 
 88. Id. at 670–71. 
 89.  Id. at 670–72. 
 90. Delaney, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 652. 
 91. See Delaney v. Baker, 951 P.2d 1183 (Cal. 1998). 
 92. According to Associate Justice Mosk: 
[S]ection 15657 is not thereby limited because section 15657.2 requires 
only that causes of action based on professional negligence be governed 
by laws that specifically apply to professional negligence actions, in 
particular the package of legislation referred to as the MICRA, and the 
statutes that are limited by section 15657 do not “specifically apply” to 
professional negligence actions. 
Delaney v. Baker, 971 P.2d 986, 989 (Cal. 1999).  
 93. Id. at 990. 
 94. Id.  
 95. Id. at 998. 
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Although the supreme court generally accepted the court of 
appeal’s reliance on the remedial nature of EADACPA, it rejected 
the court of appeal’s reliance on the definition of “specifically 
apply” and opted instead to define “based on professional 
negligence” much more narrowly than the defendants and the 
Mueller court.96  It held that “reckless neglect” under section 15657 
is distinct from causes of action “based on professional negligence” 
within the meaning of section 15657.2.97  Consequently, health care 
providers who engage in reckless neglect are acting beyond 
professional negligence and are thus subject to section 15657’s 
enhanced remedies.98  The court explained: 
The legislative history shows that the Court of Appeal’s 
interpretation is not plausible; rather it indicates that 
those who enacted the statute thought that the term 
“professional negligence,” at least within the meaning of 
section 15657.2, was mutually exclusive of the abuse and 
neglect specified in section 15657. This is seen most 
clearly in the Legislative Counsel’s Digest to the 1991 
amendments to the Elder Abuse Act, which included 
section 15657 and 15657.2. The digest describes section 
15657.2 as follows: “This bill would also specify that 
actions against health care professionals for professional 
negligence shall be governed by laws specifically 
applicable to professional negligence actions, rather than 
by these provisions.”99 
Thus, the court held that “[i]n order to obtain the remedies 
available in section 15657, a plaintiff must demonstrate by clear 
and convincing evidence that defendant is guilty of something 
more than negligence; he or she must show reckless, oppressive, 
fraudulent, or malicious conduct.”100   
This conduct is expressly distinguished from professional 
negligence.  The court explained that oppressive, fraudulent, or 
malicious conduct involves “‘intentional,’ ‘willful,’ or ‘conscious’ 
wrongdoing of a ‘despicable’ or ‘injurious’ nature.”101  In contrast 
to negligence, the court noted that recklessness “involves more 
 
 96.  See id. at 997. 
 97.  Id. at 998. 
 98. Id. at 997. 
 99. Id. at 990 (internal citations omitted) (quoting LEGIS. COUNSEL’S DIG., 
S.B. No. 679, Reg. Sess., at 1 (Cal. 1991–1992)). 
 100. Id. at 991. 
 101. Id. (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294). 
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than ‘inadvertence, incompetence, unskillfulness, or a failure to 
take precautions’ but rather rises to the level of a ‘conscious choice 
of a course of action . . . with knowledge of the serious danger to 
others involved in it.’”102 
Delaney’s general proposition, that the enhanced remedies of 
section 15657 are only available in cases of “reckless, oppressive, 
fraudulent, or malicious conduct” committed against an elder or 
dependent adult, is clear enough on the surface, but difficult to 
parse against the facts in medical abuse cases.  Bryan Carney, a 
California nursing home defense lawyer, explains: 
Delaney’s articulation of recklessness is a helpful but not 
definitive yardstick for distinguishing between elder abuse 
and professional negligence.  Its facts are deplorable, but 
not many cases lie at that end of the spectrum.  Most cases 
fall somewhere in the middle, and Delaney does not 
indicate what facts are needed, either at the pleading or 
summary judgment stage, for a case to cross the line 
separating elder abuse from professional negligence.  
That middle ground is being defined by the courts of 
appeal.  With increasing frequency, inquiries concerning 
“What did they know?” and “When did they know it?” are 
being used to draw the line between professional 
negligence and elder abuse.103 
The need for ample guidance from the appellate courts 
fleshing out the contours of the difference between professional 
negligence and reckless elder abuse is evident.  Unfortunately, as 
shown below in Parts IV and V, the decision whether to publish, 
partially publish, or even depublish relevant opinions pursuant to 
the California’s appellate publication rule interferes with this 
process and the evolution of the law.  Even in Delaney, the court of 
appeal partially published their decision, attempting to explain: 
In the published portion of our opinion, we reject 
appellants’ interpretation of EADACPA; in the 
unpublished portion of this decision, we agree with 
appellants’ contention that the special damages award was 
not supported by substantial evidence and we reject 
appellants’ argument that the Bakers should not be held 
liable personally.  In sum, we affirm in part and reverse in 
part.104 
 
 102. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 cmt. g (1965)). 
 103. Carney, supra  note 17, at 44–45. 
 104. Delaney v. Baker, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 646 (Ct. App. 1997). 
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Without access to the physical court file, it is impossible for 
researchers to gain access to parts II.A.4, II.B, and II.C of the 
opinion, thus rendering silent part of the foundation for one the 
most important national cases applying elder abuse standards to 
health practitioners. 
IV. DELANEY’S PROGENY 
The opinions—both published and unpublished—that cite 
Delaney as authority constitute the universe of potential precedent 
governing the question of whether a particular failure by a health 
care provider constitutes abuse and neglect or professional 
negligence.105  As of June 2010 there are 117 published and 
unpublished case opinions and orders that cite Delaney.  Because of 
the variation between the two primary citators, Shepard’s on 
LexisNexis, and KeyCite on Westlaw,106 this analysis constitutes a 
conglomeration of the data provided by both citators.  Of the 117 
citations on KeyCite and Shepard’s, twenty-one are orders from the 
California Superior Courts included in Westlaw, but not 
LexisNexis.107  These orders are excluded from this analysis as they 
clearly are not precedent, except for the parties involved in the 
litigation, leaving ninety-six opinions that cite Delaney, including 
seven federal district court opinions, two of which are published.  
These opinions are examined in detail below, organized by court. 
A. California Supreme Court 
The California Supreme Court has cited Delaney nine times, 
with two of the nine opinions addressing issues relating to 
professional negligence and elder abuse.108  The earlier of these two 
 
 105. A search of both annotated statutes as well as an independent search in 
Westlaw using 15657 and 15657.2, the relevant statutory section numbers, revealed 
no additional cases that cited Delaney that were not already in the list. 
 106. See William L. Taylor, Comparing KeyCite and Shepard’s for Completeness, 
Currency, and Accuracy, 92 LAW LIBR. J. 127 (2002). 
 107. KeyCite’s inclusion of trial court orders alongside published and 
unpublished opinions is confusing and misleading, as the trial court orders do not 
constitute precedent for future cases.  Thomson Reuters should include orders as 
a separate category, such as law reviews, rather than including them as equivalents 
to appellate opinions. 
 108. The seven irrelevant opinions are: Cacho v. Boudreau, 149 P.3d 473 (Cal. 
2007); People v. Canty, 90 P.3d 1168 (Cal. 2004); Kahn v. E. Side Union High Sch. 
Dist., 75 P.3d 30 (Cal. 2003); People v. Seneca Ins. Co., 62 P.3d 81 (Cal. 2003); 
Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Reiswig, 980 P.2d 895 (Cal. 1999); People v. Birkett, 
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opinions, Mueller v. Saint Joseph Medical Center,109 was 
contemporaneous with Delaney in the courts of appeal, and came to 
the opposite conclusion.110  As discussed in Part II, the California 
Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeal, Second District’s 
decision and remanded the case with instructions to reconsider the 
case in light of Delaney.  The second decision, Covenant Care, Inc. v. 
Superior Court,111 is tangential to Delaney’s holding but is instructive 
regarding the court’s interpretation of EADACPA.112   
In Covenant Care, Inc., the plaintiffs, adult children of an 
elderly decedent named Juan Inclan, alleged that the defendant 
nursing home corporation “conspired and otherwise ‘acted with 
malice and oppression’ in moving and treating decedent in order 
to maximize revenue from the Medicare and Medicaid programs 
and to avoid regulatory penalties for noncompliance with certain 
federal and state regulations.”113  They further alleged: 
While decedent was at defendants’ nursing facility . . . 
defendants knew he was suffering from Parkinson’s 
disease and was unable to care for his personal needs.  
Defendants nevertheless failed to provide decedent with 
proper care, nutrition, hydration, and medication.  
Defendants’ conduct was in conscious disregard of 
decedent’s rights and safety. Decedent was left in his bed, 
unattended and unassisted, for excessively long periods.  
Although decedent increasingly could not feed or hydrate 
himself, he was for long periods not provided assistance 
with these activities. As a result, decedent was 
inadequately stimulated, became malnourished, and lost 
much of his body weight. Decedent was left in his 
excrement for long periods; he developed ulcers on his 
body that exposed muscle and bone and became septic; 
and he also became severely dehydrated. As decedent 
deteriorated, he manifested signs and symptoms of 




980 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1999); and Barris v. County of Los Angeles, 972 P.2d 966 (Cal. 
1999). 
 109. 977 P.2d 66 (Cal. 1999). 
 110. See Delaney v. Baker, 69 Cal. Rptr.2d 645, 652 (Ct. App. 1997). 
 111. 86 P.3d 290 (Cal. 2004). 
 112. Id. at 295. 
 113. Id. at 292. 
 114. Id. at 292–93. 
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The supreme court granted review to resolve a conflict in the 
courts of appeal regarding the applicability of Section 425.13(a) of 
the California Code of Civil Procedure, which imposes procedural 
roadblocks on plaintiffs seeking punitive damages arising out of the 
professional negligence of a health care provider, to EADACPA.  
The court held that section 425.13(a) procedures do not apply in 
cases where health professionals commit elder abuse or neglect, 
noting that nothing in the text, legislative history, or purposes of 
either section 425.13(a) or EADACPA suggest that the “Legislature 
intended to afford health care providers that act as elder 
custodians, and that egregiously abuse the elders in their custody, 
the special protections against exemplary damages they enjoy when 
accused of negligence in providing health care.”115  The court 
noted that elder abuse committed by a health care provider is not 
an action that is “directly related” to the provider’s professional 
services and that “a failure to fulfill custodial duties owed by a 
custodian who happens also to be a health care provider, such 
abuse is at most incidentally related to the provider’s professional 
health care services.”116   
Practically, Covenant Care, Inc. notes that some health care 
institutions perform both custodial functions and professional 
medical care and the fact that health care professionals do both 
interrelated functions does not convert all activities into 
professional medical care subject to various tort reform statutes.117  
Thus, the court applied Delaney’s reasoning to again distinguish 
professional negligence both from egregious abuse committed by 
health care professionals, and from custodial functions conducted 
by health care institutions and their professional employees. 
B. Court of Appeal, First District 
The Court of Appeal, First District, has seventeen opinions 
that cite Delaney as authority for various propositions of law, but 
only four of the opinions, all unpublished, examine the differences 
between professional negligence and elder abuse. 118  One of the 
 
 115. Id. at 292. 
 116. Id. at 298–99. 
 117. Id. at 299. 
 118. Two of the otherwise irrelevant thirteen decisions are published opinions 
that examine other aspects of EADACPA in detail.  They are: Fitzhugh v. Granada 
Healthcare & Rehab. Ctr., LLC, 58 Cal. Rptr. 3d 585, 589 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding 
that in wrongful death and Patient Bill of Rights suit, applying arbitration clause to 
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two more substantive of these opinions is Leong v. Woods,119 where 
the court of appeal reversed the trial court’s order of summary 
judgment against the plaintiff in an action for elder abuse and the 
wrongful death of his mother, Susan Leong.120  Ms. Leong was a 
seventy-eight year-old diabetic with extensive cardiovascular disease 
who had fallen and broken a hip.121  While recovering in the 
hospital from surgery, she developed Stage II heel ulcers and was 
transferred to the Ygnacio Valley Care Center where the defendant, 
Dr. James Woods, was the attending physician.122  The defendant 
admitted that he had probably not removed her bandages to check 
her heels upon her admission on January 10, 2002.123  Then, he 
then went on vacation until February 1, 2002.124  He again did not 
check her ulcers on February 4, 2002, when a nurse told him that 
they had not healed.125  Plaintiff’s expert witness, Dr. Kathryn 
Locatell, testified: 
Woods’s care of Leong while her attending physician “fell 
below the standard of care, was gross neglect, and was 
reckless.  A patient in a skilled nursing facility simply 
should not have Stage II heel blisters advance to open, 
 
survivors of elder would “minimize the Legislature’s expression of public policy 
that under no circumstances may a patient or resident waive his or her right to sue 
for violations of rights under the Patients Bill of Rights, or other federal and state 
laws and regulations, which would include the existing Elder Abuse and 
Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act.”); and Easton v. Sutter Coast Hosp., 95 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 316 (Ct. App. 2000) (suit against doctor and nurse by children of 
deceased elder for reporting suspected elder abuse and neglect dismissed because 
mandatory reporting statute provides absolute, rather than qualified, immunity 
from suit).  The remaining irrelevant opinions are: In re Estate of Kloor, Nos. 
A117181, A117207, 2009 WL 2952224 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep 15, 2009); Clark v. Clark, 
No. A11811, 2009 WL 1863897 (Cal. Ct. App. June 29, 2009); Fernandez v. Beaton, 
No. A118592, 2009 WL 1588055 (Cal. Ct. App. June 8, 2009); Jay v. Kubly, No. 
A117103, 2008 WL 77572 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan 8, 2008); Cohen v. Five Brooks Stable, 
72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 471 (Ct. App. 2008); Feaster v. Wynn, No. A105792, 2007 WL 
1649414 (Cal. Ct. App. June 7, 2007); Trigueros v. Transamerica Corp., No. 
A108936, 2006 WL 2724034 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 25, 2006); Megrabian v. Saenz, 30 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 262 (Ct. App. 2005); Feied v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 
A102968, 2004 WL 378186 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2004); Moon v. Guardian 
Postacute Servs., Inc., 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 218 (Ct. App. 2002); and Kavanaugh v. W. 
Sonoma Cnty. Union High Sch. Dist., 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 829 (Ct. App. 2001). 
 119. No. A108730, 2006 WL 52260 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2006). 
 120. Id. at *1. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at *2. 
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infected Stage IV ulcers within eight weeks and should not 
go from being ‘well-nourished’ to being ‘significantly 
malnourished’ within six weeks.  Proper monitoring and 
caring for patients prevent this type of progression of 
these conditions.”126   
 Locatell noted that Woods failed to adequately assess Leong’s 
heels and her nutritional requirements during her stay at Ynacio 
Valley Care Center.127  Locatell stated:  
From the time of her admission (January 10, 2002) until 
the date he transferred the patient for surgical 
intervention of the infected ulcers (March 5, 200[2]), 
there is no evidence that he examined the wounds on any 
specific date.  Mrs. Leong’s heel ulcers continued to 
progress and her nutritional status continued to decline 
throughout the time Dr. Woods was her attending 
physician.  Dr. Woods’s failure to properly diagnose the 
condition of the wounds and Mrs. Leong’s malnutrition in 
a timely manner led to his failure to issue appropriate 
orders for her care.128 
The court held that:  
The question is whether Woods’s failure to ensure that 
others complied with his orders and his failure to notice 
or make sure that Leong’s weight was being taken 
regularly demonstrated a “‘deliberate disregard’ of the 
‘high degree of probability’ that an injury will occur’” or 
made a “‘conscious choice of a course of action . . . with 
knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it.’”  
Woods’s testimony that he could not recall whether he 
reviewed Leong’s chart to determine whether his orders 
concerning care for her heel wounds were followed and 
his testimony that he normally did not check to see if his 








 126.  Id. at *5. 
 127.  Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at *16 (quoting Delaney v. Baker, 971 P.2d 986, 991 (Cal. 1999)) 
(citation omitted). 
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 In contrast to Leong, in Trengali v. Northern California 
Presbyterian Homes, Inc.,130 the Court of Appeal, First District, 
affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of an elder abuse claim against 
the nursing staff at The Sequoias, a residential facility for the 
elderly where Helen Steffan spent seventeen years of her life.131  Ms. 
Steffen was suffering from extreme pain, swelling, and abdominal 
cramps over a period of five weeks.132  One of Ms. Steffen’s 
daughters stopped a doctor on his rounds and asked him to help 
her mother.133  He replied “he could not do anything because there 
was nothing wrong with Ms. Steffen.”134  A month later, another 
daughter took her to the emergency room where they intubated 
400cc’s of gastric and fecal matter through a tube in her nose.135  
The hospital found an ileocecal tumor had blocked her bowel.136  
After a month of care in the hospital, Ms. Steffen was discharged to 
another nursing home, where she died three months later.137  Her 
heirs brought suit against the nursing home’s staff for failing to 
“inform the attending physicians of Ms. Steffen’s true medical 
status” resulting in a “denied . . . opportunity to be properly 
diagnosed and to receive medical care in the first instance.”138  Ms. 
Steffen’s heirs argued that earlier detection of the tumor would 
have improved her quality of life during her last year.139  The Court 
of Appeal, First District, rejected the elder abuse claim, explaining: 
 In contrast to these cases illustrating egregious abuse of 
the elderly, this case involves an allegation that members 
of the nursing staff at The Sequoias were remiss in not 
reporting sufficient information to the physicians so that 
 
 130. No. A094106, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4742 (Ct. App. Jan. 18, 
2002).  Somewhat surprisingly, this case is not included in Westlaw’s California 
case database.  If appellate courts release unpublished opinions to Thomson 
Reuters and LexisNexis for de facto publication in the two big legal research 
services, it is imperative that everyone involved in the process ensures that the 
databases are complete and correct.  “Old-fashioned” publication in print 
reporters gives the publishers ample opportunity to check for error, including 
missing opinions.  Digital publication needs to be conducted with the same degree 
of care. 
 131. Id. at *3. 
 132. Id. at *4. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at *5. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id.  
 138. Id. at *5–6. 
 139. Id. at *9. 
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the cause of Ms. Steffen’s abdominal distress could be 
more rapidly diagnosed.  Significantly, there has been no 
showing in this case that the nursing staff ignored Ms. 
Steffen’s medical condition, deprive [sic] her of needed 
care in any significant sense, or displayed an intention of 
harming her by withholding treatment.  Instead, the 
undisputed evidence demonstrates rather conclusively 
that the nursing staff was not fully aware of the 
significance of some of the warning signs of intestinal 
blockage displayed by Ms. Steffen and may have been 
remiss in not communicating more effectively with her 
physicians.  In sum, the proof falls far short of supporting 
a finding that the nursing staff acted with recklessness, 
oppression, fraud or malice in providing medical care to 
Ms. Steffen.   
 Appellants attempt to promote their claim of negligence 
to one of recklessness by dressing it up with bits and 
pieces of the deposition testimony of three of Ms. 
Steffen’s treating physicians.  When questioned, the 
physicians indicated they had no independent 
recollection of certain conversations with the nursing staff 
or medical record entries with respect the treatment 
provided Ms. Steffen several years earlier.  Appellants 
argue: “The discrepancies in [the head nurse’s] testimony 
and that of the physicians and the irregularities in the 
medical records give rise to a strong inference that the 
medical records were falsified, an act of recklessness in 
itself.”  To allow the jury to find the type of wrongful 
conduct necessary to qualify for the heightened remedies 
under the Elder Abuse Act from these facts, however, 
would be to sanction an impermissible degree of 
speculation.  The fact the physicians could not remember 
these events is not surprising given the amount of time 
that had passed.  Appellants have failed to show that there 
is a triable issue of fact as to their claims under the Elder 
Abuse Act.140  
While somewhat harsh in tone, especially given the horrific 
medical facts, Trengali clearly stands for the position that finding 
recklessness requires more than a showing of poor medical 
outcomes and questionable record keeping.  It also illuminates a 
key tension in nursing home litigation, the inherent conflict 
between negligent nursing staff and attending, off-site physicians 
 
 140. Id. at *16–18. 
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who make occasional rounds.141 
The other two relevant Court of Appeal, First District, opinions 
contrasting professional negligence and elder abuse are also 
unpublished, but are less instructive regarding the difference 
between professional negligence and elder abuse.  In Marasovic v. 
Alta Bates Medical Center,142 the court of appeal sustained a demurrer 
in which the trial court rejected an argument that a hospital and 
hospital social worker committed elder abuse when they caused 
Elizabeth Marasovic to be “admitted to a nursing home against her 
will, knowing that the nursing home in question (Shields-
Richmond) did not honor do not resuscitate (DNR) orders and 
had unsafe conditions.”143  The plaintiff, the decedent’s daughter, 
failed to prove that this allegation constituted professional 
negligence.144  The court of appeal reasoned that “[i]f respondents’ 
treatment of Elizabeth was not negligent, then a fortiori it did not 
involve intentional, willful, or reckless misconduct.”145 
Similarly, in Mooradian v. Convalescent Center Mission Street,146 the 
Court of Appeal, First District, affirmed summary judgment against 
the plaintiff in a case where an elderly resident with significant 
cognitive and physical maladies died from a stroke brought on by a 
brain injury caused by an unobserved fall.147  The court held that 
the plaintiff “failed to present evidence of any conduct”148 of the 
facility, intentional or otherwise, that inflicted head trauma on 
decedent: 
Because appellant cannot show a triable issue of material 
fact that Center acted negligently, it is clear that appellant 
cannot meet the higher burden, required under the Elder 
Abuse Act, of showing, by clear and convincing evidence, 
that Center acted recklessly, or is guilty of oppression, 
fraud, or malice. . . .  Center’s reckless neglect cannot be 
inferred simply because decedent suffered a serious 
 
 141. See Marshall B. Kapp, The Liability Environment for Physicians Providing 
Nursing Home Medical Care: Does It Make a Difference for Residents?, 16 ELDER L. J. 249, 
270–71 (2009) (describing legal anxiety experienced by nursing home physicians 
when they must rely upon nursing staff for information and execution of 
treatment). 
 142. No. A106355, 2006 WL 367350 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 2006). 
 143. Id. at *7. 
 144. Id. at *2. 
 145. Id. at *8. 
 146. No. A122009, 2009 WL 1863896 (Cal. Ct. App. June 29, 2009). 
 147. Id. at *1. 
 148. Id. at *7. 
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injury. We conclude that the trial court did not err in 
granting summary judgment against appellant’s elder 
abuse claim.149 
Marasovic and Mooradian demonstrate that, where the trial 
court finds the evidence insufficient to prove professional 
negligence, the Court of Appeal, First District, will summarily 
affirm a trial court’s rejection of any elder abuse or neglect claim, 
and the opinion will likely be unpublished. 
C. Court of Appeal, Second District 
The Court of Appeal, Second District, has by far the greatest 
number of citations to Delaney of any of the courts of appeal.  Of 
the thirty-two citations, sixteen are irrelevant to the issue of 
professional negligence and elder abuse by health care 
practitioners.150  Of the remaining opinions, five are published, and 
the remaining eleven are unpublished.  Two of the published cases 
have been discussed above.151  As noted in the introduction, Sababin 
v. Superior Court152 highlights the bar’s desire to have an 
unpublished elder abuse case reconsidered for publication.153  In 
Sababin, the court reversed summary adjudication on behalf of the 
defendants, holding: 
[I]t is reasonably deducible that Covina’s employees 
neglected to follow the care plan by failing to check 
 
 149. Id. 
 150. The irrelevant opinions are: Andrews v. Superior Court, No. B219388, 
2010 WL 1694468 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2010); Lewis v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 
No. B199966, 2008 WL 4076000 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 04, 2008); Sanders v. Lawson, 
78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 851 (Ct. App. 2008); DeWalsche v. Genis, No. B183044, 2006 WL 
3804521 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2006); McCray v. Garcia, No. B179477, 2006 WL 
1900873 (Cal. Ct. App. July 12, 2006); Pitluck v. Beverly Enter., Inc., No. B179680, 
2005 WL 3008579 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2005); In re Conservatorship of Kayle, 35 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 671 (2005); Gonzales v. Whittier Hosp. Medic. Center, No. B175273, 
2005 WL 2360080 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 27, 2005); Gonzales v. Nasser-Moaddeli, No. 
B176152, 2005 WL 1970955 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2005); In re Estate of Lowrie, 
12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 828 (Ct. App. 2004); Sandore v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., No. 
B157766, 2003 WL 1950252 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2003); Johnson v. Superior 
Court, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650 (Ct. App. 2002); Conservatorship of Pers. and Estate 
of Marion Adams v. Butler, No. B143700, 2002 WL 111356 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 
2002); California Amplifier, Inc. v. RLI Ins. Co., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 915 (Ct. App. 
2001); Hellinger v. Farmers Group, Inc., 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 268, 91 Cal. App. 4th 
1049 (2001); and Perry v. Shaw, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 70 (Ct. App. 2001). 
 151. See supra Part I. 
 152. 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 266 (Ct. App. 2006). 
 153. See Sababin v. Superior Court, No. B190060, 2006 WL 2615418 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Sept. 13, 2006). 
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Renteria’s skin condition on a daily basis and failing to 
notify a physician of the need for a treatment order.  
Thus, there is a triable issue as to whether Covina’s 
employee’s conduct was neglect under section 15610.57 
because they failed to provide Renteria with medical care 
for physical needs and to protect her from health and 
safety hazards.  Moreover, when the evidence and 
inferences are liberally construed, we easily conclude that 
there is a triable issue as to whether Covina’s employees 
acted with recklessness, oppression or malice.  A trier of 
fact could find that when a care facility’s employees 
ignore a care plan and fail to check the skin condition of 
a resident with Huntington’s Chorea, such conduct shows 
deliberate disregard of the high degree of probability that 
she will suffer injury.154  
Since the defendant’s failure to follow a resident’s treatment 
plan can constitute elder abuse and neglect under EADACPA,155 it 
is clear why the plaintiff’s bar wanted Sababin published.  It 
arguably expands the definition of recklessness to a pattern of 
“repeated withholding of care” which “leads to the conclusion that 
the pattern was the result of choice or deliberate indifference.”156  A 
pattern and practice of neglectful behaviors is one of the key 
factual findings in Sababin about abusive behavior by health care 
professionals as it evinces an on-going disregard of the patient’s 
well-being.157 
The other previously discussed published opinion is Covenant 
Care, Inc. v. Superior Court,158 which was affirmed by the supreme 
court and discussed under the supreme court heading in this 
part.159 
The remaining three published opinions from the Court of 
Appeal, Second District, that cite Delaney address tangential issues 
that illuminate the difference between professional negligence and 
elder abuse and neglect committed by health care professionals.  In 
Country Villa Claremont Healthcare Center, Inc. v. Superior Court,160 over 
a period of fourteen months, Ms. Ernestina Rodriguez, a seventy-
six-year-old nursing home resident with Parkinson’s disease, 
 
 154. Sababin, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 272–73. 
 155. See id.  
 156. Id. at 273. 
 157. See id. 
 158. 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 291 (Ct. App. 2001). 
 159. See supra Part IV.A. 
 160. 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d  315 (Ct. App. 2004). 
26
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss1/4
  
232 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1 
suffered extensively due to poor care.161  She rarely received the 
pain reliever prescribed by her physician.162  She developed 
pressure ulcers on both heels which resulted in amputation of her 
left leg due to gangrene.163  After the surgery, when she was 
admitted to Country Villa Claremont Healthcare Center, the ulcer 
on her right heel worsened and she was often left in filthy and 
unsanitary conditions.164  She eventually died of aspirational 
pneumonia “as a result of Country Villa’s failure to provide her 
with the proper diet of puree food, monitor her food intake, and 
assist with her eating.”165  Her heirs sued pursuant to EADACPA, 
including a claim for punitive damages.166  The court of appeal, 
relying on Covenant Care, Inc., held that Section 425.13 of the 
California Code of Civil Procedure inapplicable in elder abuse 
actions, and thus would not bar punitive damages.167 
Benun v. Superior Court168 also applied the analysis from 
Covenant Care, Inc., when it held that the three year statute of 
limitations for professional negligence does not apply to actions 
under EADACPA.169  The court explained: 
Thus, Delaney makes clear that a cause of action for 
custodial elder abuse against a health care provider is a 
separate and distinct cause of action from one for 
professional negligence against a health care provider.  It 
follows that egregious acts of elder abuse are not 
governed by laws applicable to negligence.  Specifically, 
section 15657.2 was enacted “to make sufficiently clear 
that ‘professional negligence’ was to be beyond the scope 
of section 15657.”  Section 15657.2 specifies that actions 
for professional negligence as defined in section 340.5 are 
governed by laws specifically applicable to actions for 
professional negligence (e.g., § 340.5), so it would seem to 
follow that section 340.5 has no application to actions 
brought under section 15657.170 
Consequently, the court of appeal reversed the trial court, 
 
 161. Id. at 317. 
 162. Id.  
 163. Id.  
 164. Id. at 317–18. 
 165. Id. at 318. 
 166. Id. at 318. 
 167. Id. at 322. 
 168. 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d  26 (Ct. App. 2004). 
 169. Id. at 35–37. 
 170. Id. at 34 (quotation omitted). 
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which had applied the three-year statute of limitations on the 
premise that the facts in the case showed professional negligence 
rather than elder abuse.171 
Most recently, in Perlin v. Fountain View Management, Inc.,172 a 
partially published opinion, the Court of Appeal, Second District, 
addressed the question whether Section 15657 of EADACPA’s clear 
and convincing standard for recovery of attorney fees applied to 
both causation and liability or just liability.173  Ms. Helen Perlin 
developed a leg wound due to inappropriate use of a continuous 
passive motion machine after she had a knee replaced.174  She died 
a month later of pneumonia while still in the hospital for her leg 
wound.175  The jury found the defendants guilty of elder abuse and 
awarded the plaintiffs $300,000, which was remitted to $250,000 
plus pre-judgment interest pursuant to section 15657.176  Plaintiffs 
moved for $781,945.25 in attorney’s fees, arguing that they were 
entitled to such fees because: 
[T]he jury found by clear and convincing evidence that 
one or more of Summit Care’s employees acted recklessly 
in the medical or custodial care of Perlin, and the parties 
had stipulated that Summit Care ratified the acts and 
omissions of its employees.  The jury found causation 
under a preponderance of the evidence standard, but was 
unable to reach a verdict for causation under the clear 
and convincing evidence standard.177   
The Court of Appeal, Second District, affirmed the denial of 
the fees motion as the plaintiffs had failed to prove causation of Ms. 
Perlin’s injury by clear and convincing evidence.178  The plaintiffs 
argued that elder abuse actions were not independent actions, but 
only grounds for additional remedies that rested upon a base of 
negligence, which only require a preponderance of the evidence to 
establish causation.179  The court of appeal rejected this argument, 
holding that EADACPA creates an independent cause of action for 
elder abuse.180 
 
 171. Id. at 29–30. 
 172. 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d  743 (Ct. App. 2008). 
 173. Id. at 746–51. 
 174. Id. at 745. 
 175. Id. at 746. 
 176. Id. at 745. 
 177. Id. at 747. 
 178. Id. at 750. 
 179. See id. at 748–49. 
 180. Id. at 749–50.; see also Sande L. Buhai & James W. Gilliam, Jr., Honor Thy 
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The remaining ten unpublished opinions, not including the 
unpublished version of Sababin discussed above, are split regarding 
whether the reviewing court of appeal found elder abuse, 
professional neglect, or neither on the part of the defendant health 
care provider.  In four of the ten cases, the evidence of elder abuse 
committed by health care practitioners was found sufficient to state 
a claim or sustain a judgment. 
In Hubbard v. Zargarian,181 the Court of Appeal, Second 
District, made an important distinction between elder abuse and 
neglect committed by the staff of a hospital as opposed to possible 
professional negligence, committed by a treating physician.182  Ms. 
Hattie Southall, an eighty-two-year-old, was admitted for a 
myocardial infarction.183  During her sixteen-day stay in the 
hospital, she had developed a gangrenous foot and serious 
decubitus ulcers.184  The court of appeal reversed the trial court’s 
grant of demurrer on the pleading in favor of the hospital, holding 
the “allegations show a deliberate disregard of the high degree of 
probability Southall would suffer severe pressure ulcers/gangrene 
and are sufficient to assert a cause of action for elder abuse based 
on reckless neglect.”185  Interestingly, the court of appeal affirmed 
the demurrer of the elder abuse claim against the treating 
physician for failing to ensure that the nurses carried out a skin 
integrity plan.186  It noted: 
There are no fact allegations that Dr. Zargarian provided 
custodial care or was responsible for supervising the 
nurses at SFMC and appellant cites no legal authority 
imposing such a duty on a cardiologist.  At best, the other 
allegations against Dr. Zargarian reflect professional 
negligence, i.e., the lack of the use of reasonable care.187   
Citing Covenant Care, Inc., the court of appeal distinguished 
between the custodial care responsibilities and the medical care 
conducted by the treating physician, dismissing the importance of 
 
Mother and Father: Preventing Elder Abuse Through Education and Litigation 36 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 565, 572–73 (2003) (analyzing the conflict regarding whether 
EADACPA creates a separate cause of action). 
 181. No. B207427, 2009 WL 4043507 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2009). 
 182.  See id. at *3.  
 183. Id. at *1. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at *7. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
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the physician’s skin care plan because he was a cardiologist.188 
In Camacho v. Meridian Neurocare,189 the Court of Appeal, 
Second District, affirmed a judgment against a nursing home for 
wrongful death and elder abuse.190  The nursing staff failed to 
adequately treat and record the decedent’s fever, infection, and 
pressure sores and used “canned” comments on the care charts that 
did not reflect actual treatment.191  As a result of these actions, the 
decedent rapidly lost weight.192  The court of appeal, relying on 
Delaney, found that there was sufficient evidence of egregious 
neglect to warrant a judgment of elder abuse and neglect.193 
In Gibson v. Superior Court,194 the court of appeal vacated the 
trial court’s demurrer, and found that an estate’s complaint alleged 
sufficient facts to initiate a claim under EADACPA for elder abuse 
which resulted in the wrongful death of Ms. Thelma Gibson.195  Ms. 
Gibson, suffering from dementia,196 was in a skilled nursing facility 
recovering from a hip replacement when she suffered another 
broken hip because she tried to get out of her wheelchair when no 
assistant was nearby.197  The court of appeal observed: 
Among other things, the estate’s complaint alleges (1) the 
defendants were aware that Gibson needed “Full 
Assist[ance] . . . for eating, transferring, and ambulating”; 
(2) Gibson was unsupervised by any nurse at the time of 
the fall that is the subject of the elder abuse claim; (3) the 
nursing facility consciously failed to provide a geri-chair 
with a tray to restrain Gibson from getting up unassisted; 
(4) the nursing facility consciously failed to provide 
sufficient budget and staffing to meet patient needs; and 
(5) the facility had received several deficiency notices 
relating to the risks of patients falling.  Together, these 




 188. Id. at *3. 
 189. No. B178473, 2006 WL 1391223 (Cal. Ct. App. May 23, 2006). 
 190. Id. at *1. 
 191. Id. at *3. 
 192. Id. at *7. 
 193. See id. at *6–11. 
 194. No. B192421, 2006 WL 2865652 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2006). 
 195. Id. at *3. 
 196. Id. at *1 n.1. 
 197. Id.  
 198. Id. at *3. 
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Thus, insufficient staffing resulting in bodily harm is sufficient 
in some cases to show recklessness under EADACPA.199 
Insufficient staffing is also at the core of Trujillo v. Superior 
Court of Los Angeles County,200 where the Court of Appeal, Second 
District, reversed the demurrer sustained by the trial court, holding 
that “[w]hile certainly not as egregious as the situations depicted in 
Delaney and Mack, the facts alleged by petitioner here state a cause 
of action for elder abuse.”201  In Trujillo, the plaintiff’s mother, 
Clara Reyes, died of sepsis caused by an infected skin ulcer.202  She 
was first treated on January 11, 2000, by a home health nurse who 
scheduled a subsequent visit on January 13, 2000.203  When no nurse 
appeared on January 13, the patient’s family called because her 
infection was seeping, smelling awful, and getting worse.204  The 
Home Health Agency informed them that they did not have a 
nurse available.205  The next day someone from the agency called to 
instruct the family how to change the dressings.206  When a nurse 
failed to appear for two more days, the plaintiffs took Ms. Reyes to 
the hospital, where she died on February 20, 2000.207 
Associate Justice Grignon dissented in Trujillo, arguing that the 
facts did not demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that 
the defendants neglected Ms. Reyes.208  He concluded: 
Here, in stark contrast to Delaney and Mack, plaintiff has 
failed to allege any facts showing reckless neglect, but has 
alleged only conduct showing professional negligence.  
Patient was not a residential patient, but rather resided in 
the home of her family. Home Health Agency had no 
control over Patient’s hospitalization.  Patient was under 
the sporadic care of Home Health Agency for only five 
days. Home Health Agency did not cause Patient’s 
decubitus ulcers that eventually led to Patient’s death.  
Home Health Agency did not leave Patient to deteriorate 
for an extended period of time. Home Health Agency did 
not abandon Patient. Home Health Agency missed a 
 
 199. See also Arnold & Arnold, supra note 80, at 32. 
 200. No. B155860, 2002 WL 1558830 (Cal. Ct. App. July 16, 2002). 
 201. Id. at *4. 
 202. Id. at *1. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id.  
 205. Id.  
 206. Id. 
 207. Id.  
 208. Id. at *5 (Grignon, J., dissenting). 
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single at-home visit and instead telephoned wound care 
instructions to the Patient’s family the next day.  Two days 
later, Patient’s family had admitted her to the hospital. . . . 
In my view, the trial court properly sustained the 
demurrer as to the elder abuse cause of action. Though 
dressed up with exaggerated allegations of the Home 
Health Agency’s broader misconduct, the actual 
deficiencies alleged do not constitute egregious acts of 
neglect, but ordinary professional negligence.209 
Surprisingly, despite the being a very close case with a strong 
dissent, the Court of Appeal, Second District, chose not to publish 
Trujillo as precedent. 
In Pagarigan v. Greater Valley Medical Group, Inc.,210 the court of 
appeal heard a complicated appeal with a number of interrelated 
defendants.  The plaintiffs alleged that the nursing home operator, 
LibbyCare-Longwood, allowed the decedent to develop a severe 
pressure sore on her lower back that measured five by eight 
inches.211  Additionally, she developed a severe infection at the 
entry site of her gastric feeding tube, which caused her abdomen to 
distend and darken in color.212  Finally, the plaintiffs alleged that 
the defendant did not transfer her to an acute care facility until it 
was too late, when she was sent to hospice care to die.213  On the 
issue of professional negligence and elder abuse, the court held 
that the plaintiff had “failed to allege a sufficient degree of 
recklessness,” and that the trial court had abused its discretion in 
refusing to permit amendment of the complaint.214  Presumably, 
the claim, as alleged, lacked evidence of a callous disregard of the 
decedent’s welfare, necessary to connect her horrific injuries with 
the defendant’s behavior. 
In Marchesano v. Dekkers,215 the Court of Appeal, Second 
District, affirmed the trial court’s judgment on the pleadings in 
favor of the defendant, a physician who failed to identify a hip 
fracture in a nursing home patient.216  Richard Marchesano, an 
 
 209. Id. at *8–9. 
 210. No. B172642, 2006 WL 2425298 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2006). 
 211. Id. at *1. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at *14. 
 215. No. B180297, 2006 WL 1351474 (Cal. Ct. App. May 18, 2006).  
 216. Id. at *1. 
32
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss1/4
  
238 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1 
eighty-year-old, injured himself getting out of a wheelchair.217  Dr. 
Dekkers did not diagnosis the fracture in the x-ray.218  Despite Mr. 
Marchesano’s complaint of severe leg pain and request for 
additional x-rays, Dr. Dekkers did not examine Mr. Marchesano 
until his next scheduled rounds.219  About two months later, family 
members took Mr. Marchesano “to an orthopedist who diagnosed a 
fractured hip that was two to three months old.”220  Both the trial 
court and court of appeal found that the plaintiffs, Marchesano’s 
heirs, failed to prove any degree of recklessness or maliciousness on 
the part of Dr. Dekker.221  The court concluded that the plaintiffs 
“may not recast the medical malpractice action as a claim for elder 
abuse.”222 
In Renko v. Northridge Care Center, Inc.,223 the Court of Appeal, 
Second District, reversed the trial court’s dismissal of professional 
negligence and wrongful death claims against a nursing home and 
physician, but affirmed the dismissal of the elder abuse and neglect 
claim.224  The decedent, Paul J. Renko Sr., developed stage IV 
pressure sores, which “became severely infected with, among other 
things, necrotizing fasciatus (the so-called ‘flesh-eating bacteria’) 
which ‘ate’ into important organs and structures in his body 
including portions of his genitalia.  His infections remained 
untreated for a lengthy period of time, leading to the loss of 
substantial tissue, excruciating pain and death.”225  The court of 
appeal found the allegations that the physician, Dr. Dowds, failed 
to properly treat severe anemia, dehydration, malnutrition, and 
decubitus ulcers alongside his failure to transfer Mr. Renko to a 
hospital when it became clear that the nursing home could not 
meet his needs, were sufficient to demonstrate professional 
negligence.226  Nonetheless, because the plaintiffs “failed to plead 
the level of culpability required to establish elder abuse,” the court 
of appeal sustained the dismissal of elder abuse and neglect 
claims.227  The court observed:  
 
 217. Id.  
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. at *1–2. 
 222. Id. at *4. 
 223. Nos. B173512, B175474, 2005 WL 2045352 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2005). 
 224. Id. at *24. 
 225. Id. at *1. 
 226. Id. at *7. 
 227. Id. at *20. 
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Here, in contrast to the facts in both Mack v. Soung and 
Delaney v. Baker, appellants have alleged conduct rising 
only to the level of professional negligence, not reckless 
neglect.  The key distinction between this matter and the 
foregoing cases is that appellants have failed to allege that 
any defendant knew about decedent’s deteriorating 
condition and thereafter failed to act.  Rather, appellants 
alleged that defendants failed to provide adequate 
medical care and that, as a result of that failure, decedent 
suffered injury.  They further alleged that defendants 
“knew or should have known” that decedent required 
hospitalization to avoid further injury.  But there is no 
indication in the elder abuse statutes that constructive 
knowledge suffices to establish recklessness.228 
Thus, the court of appeal, Second District, was unwilling to 
impute constructive knowledge, the “should have known” standard, 
to determine whether a defendant acted beyond gross negligence 
into a state of recklessness.229 
In Reyome v. Sunrise Senior Living Services, Inc.,230 the court 
applied the Delaney standard to an accident wherein a nursing 
home resident with Alzheimer’s disease was dropped during a 
transfer from her wheelchair to her bed and the resulting brain 
trauma caused her death within six hours.231  While the transfer did 
not completely comply with the facility’s written transfer policy, the 
court found there was no indication that the deviation from those 
procedures constituted a “deliberate disregard” for the decedent’s 
safety resulting in a “high degree of probability” that an injury 
would result, or that it was part of a “conscious choice of a course 
of action . . . with knowledge of the serious danger to others.”232  
Thus, the actions of the staff constituted negligence at most, not 
elder abuse.233 
In Furlong v. Catholic Healthcare West,234 the plaintiffs brought an 
EADACPA abuse complaint against physicians and other health 
care providers for failing to honor an elder’s “do not resuscitate” 
order, keeping her alive and in debilitating pain for an additional 
 
 228. Id. at *22. 
 229. See id. 
 230. No. B174986, 2004 WL 2749811 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2004).  
 231. Id. at *1. 
 232. Id. at *7. 
 233. Id. at *8. 
 234. No. B172067, 2004 WL 2958274 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2004). 
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ten days.235  The trial court dismissed the action and the Court of 
Appeal, Second District, affirmed the dismissal, holding that “the 
resuscitation of a dying patient does not amount to the failure to 
provide medical care as discussed in Delaney, but rather describes 
negligence in the undertaking of medical care.”236 
In Doepke v. Ponhold,237 the court of appeal affirmed summary 
judgment against a plaintiff who sued his doctor for medical 
negligence and elder abuse.238  When Mr. Doepke, who was 
recovering from a stroke in an assisted living facility, complained of 
leg pain, a therapist measured his legs and found a three to four 
inch difference.239  Dr. Ponhold read the x-rays when they arrived, 
five days after they were taken, but failed to discover Mr. Doepke’s 
fractured hip.240  Based on expert testimony that Dr. Ponhold did 
not breach the standard of care sufficient to support a professional 
negligence action, the court of appeal affirmed the grant of 
summary judgment, holding that the plaintiff “failed to raise a 
triable issue of material fact with respect to his negligence cause of 
action and, therefore, cannot show ‘something more than 
negligence’ as required under Welfare & Institutions Code section 
15657.”241 
D. Court of Appeal, Third District 
The Court of Appeal, Third District, cited Delaney six times, 
with two published opinions which addressed professional 
negligence and elder abuse, and four irrelevant decisions.242  In 
Mack v. Soung,243 an opinion certified for partial publication, the 
court reversed the trial court’s demurrer of an elder abuse and 
neglect claim against Dr. Lian Soung and the Covenant Care 
Nursing and Rehabilitation Center.244  The plaintiffs, the children 
 
 235. Id. at *1. 
 236. Id. at *10. 
 237. No. B153989, 2003 WL 116454 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2003). 
 238. Id. at *1. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. at *3. 
 242. The irrelevant opinions are: Towns v. Davidson, 54 Cal. Rptr. 3d 568, 575 
(Ct. App. 2007); Teachers’ Ret. Bd. v. Genest, 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 326, 337 (Ct. App. 
2007); Souza v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp., 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 389, 396 (Ct. App. 2006); 
and Arbuckle-College City Fire Prot. Dist. v. Cnty. of Colusa, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 182, 
192 (Ct. App. 2003).  
 243. 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 830 (Ct. App. 2000). 
 244. Id. at 837. 
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of Ms. Girth Mack, alleged that in August 1996 Ms. Mack was left in 
a bedpan for thirteen consecutive hours, resulting in the 
development of an untreatable stage III bedsore.245  Dr. Soung and 
the nursing home concealed the existence of the bedsore until 
September 4, 1996, and refused to permit the plaintiffs to inspect 
the injury until an ombudsman intervened on their behalf on 
September 10, 1996.246  Dr. Soung opposed her hospitalization until 
her condition worsened in October, and then he abandoned Ms. 
Mack and refused to respond to repeated requests by nursing staff 
to permit her hospitalization.247  On October 8, 1996, Dr. Soung 
mailed a notice of withdrawal of care to Ms. Mack’s former address 
despite the fact that she was no longer competent, and that he 
knew plaintiffs were making surrogate decisions on her behalf.248  
On October 9, 1996, he advised Sylvester Mack, Ms. Mack’s son, 
that he would withdraw in thirty days unless the plaintiffs found 
another physician earlier.249  Two days later, the nurses advised the 
plaintiffs that Ms. Mack was dying, but that Dr. Soung refused to 
permit her hospitalization.250  Because his authority was essential in 
order to transfer her to the hospital, the plaintiffs were forced to 
remove Ms. Mack’s wristband and “tell the emergency room staff 
that she had no primary physician, in order to secure her 
admission to the hospital.”251  Ms. Mack died on October 13, 1996.252 
After the trial court granted Dr. Soung a demurrer on the 
claims of elder abuse and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, he “obtained an order granting summary judgment as to 
plaintiffs’ only surviving cause of action, that of professional 
negligence, on the ground that the total recoverable damages 
against Dr. Soung could not exceed the amount plaintiffs already 
received from a settling codefendant.”253  On appeal, Dr. Soung 
argued that his conduct was, at most, professionally negligent.254  
The court of appeal reversed the demurrer and summary 
judgment, explaining that “[r]ecklessly withdrawing needed 
 
 245. Id. at 832. 
 246. Id.  
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id.  
 251. Id. at 832–33. 
 252. Id. at 832. 
 253. Id. at 833. 
 254. Id. at 834. 
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medical care from an elderly patient with conscious disregard for 
the high probability of injury or suffering, whether ‘willful 
misconduct’ or not, is precisely the sort of egregious behavior 
which the Legislature sought to remedy in passing the Act.”255 
The court also rejected Dr. Soung’s more sophisticated 
argument, in which he claimed he was an on-call physician who did 
not have “care and custody” over the patient, and, therefore, 
pursuant to the definition of neglect in EADACPA,256 he was not in 
violation.257  In rejecting this interpretation, the court found that 
Dr. Soung could be seen as liable under EADACPA, because there 
were two groups defined in EADACPA as giving “care and custody” 
to elders: “health practitioners” and “care custodians.”258  “Health 
practitioner” explicitly includes physicians.259  The court reinforced 
its finding by noting that the legislature intended to convey that 
each of these two groups had “care and custody,” as noted in the 
“Mandatory and Nonmandatory Reports of Abuse” section of 
EADACPA: “‘[a]ny person who has assumed full or intermittent 
responsibility for care or custody of an elder or dependent adult, 
whether or not that person receives compensation, including . . . 
any elder or dependent adult care custodian, health 
practitioner, . . . is a mandated reporter.’”260  The court concluded: 
Dr. Soung’s interpretation would impose liability on 
residential institutions housing the elderly for willful 
deprivation of medical care, but exempt physicians from 
engaging in the same conduct.  The statutory language 
does not so provide.  Moreover, there is no evidence the 
Legislature intended to leave such a loophole in the Act.  
As Delaney teaches, liability under the Act should not turn 
upon the licensing status of the defendant.  We conclude 
that Dr. Soung’s status as a physician does not immunize 
 
 255. Id. at 835 n.4.  
 256. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.57 (West 2010) (“‘Neglect’ means either 
of the following: (1) The negligent failure of any person having the care or 
custody of an elder or a dependent adult to exercise that degree of care that a 
reasonable person in a like position would exercise. (2) The negligent failure of 
an elder or dependent adult to exercise that degree of self care that a reasonable 
person in a like position would exercise.”). 
 257. Mack, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 835. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id.; see also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.37 (defining “health 
practitioner”). 
 260. Mack, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 835 (quoting CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 
15630(a)) (emphasis removed). 
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him from liability for elder abuse.261 
Mack, resting on evidence of reckless behavior on the part of a 
resentful physician, provides a second egregious example of 
physician elder abuse and neglect which amplifies the facts and 
holding of Delaney.  As a partially published opinion, it is frequently 
cited alongside Delaney to elucidate the definition of reckless and 
oppressive behavior sufficient to trigger section 15657’s heightened 
remedies.262   
As the only published opinion which found a health care 
practitioner guilty of professional negligence, but not elder abuse, 
Massey v. Mercy Medical Center Redding,263 provides factual details 
which contrast with the holding in Mack.  Massey is a rare appellate 
EADACPA case because it was brought by the patient himself, as he 
survived the poor quality care.264  Carl R. Massey, a sixty-five-year-old 
at the time of the incident, underwent bifemoral bypass surgery.265  
The nursing staff at Mercy Medical Center Redding noted after the 
operation that Mr. Massey was a substantial fall risk, and would 
need a walker and assistance.266  On March 9, 2006, Mr. Massey rang 
for a nurse to help him to the bathroom.267  Nurse Ken O’Bar came 
to his room and helped him out of bed and into his walker.268  
Nurse O’Bar then said he had to leave to do something.269  After 
fifteen minutes of waiting, Massey attempted to walk, fell 
backwards, and hit his head, back, and behind on the wall and 
floor of his room.270  He sustained a compression fracture to his 
back.271  He was apparently not found for two hours.272  Nurse O’Bar 
administered morphine sulfate approximately four hours after the 
fall.273   
 
 
 261. Id. at 836 (citation omitted). 
 262. See, e.g., Trujillo v. Superior Court of Los Angeles Cnty., No. B155860, 
2002 WL 1558830 (Cal. Ct. App. July 16, 2002) (citing both Mack and Delaney 
numerous times). 
 263. 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 209 (Ct. App. 2009). 
 264. Id. at 211. 
 265. Id. at 212. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id.  
 268. Id. 
 269. Id.  
 270. Id.  
 271. Id.  
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. at 212–14. 
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The original complaint alleged that nurse O’Bar was 
“negligent” for leaving the plaintiff unattended in his walker.274  
The amended complaint alleged “medical negligence” not only for 
the original complaint, but also for nurse O’Bar administering 
morphine sulfate without a valid prescription and without 
informed consent.275 
The Court of Appeal, Third District, upheld the trial court’s 
decision to sustain the defendant’s motion for nonsuit, holding 
that the evidence did not show “the necessary recklessness or 
deliberate disregard that would sustain a cause of action for Elder 
Abuse.”276  Additionally, there was insufficient evidence to show that 
the nurse acted fraudulently by hiding the severity of the plaintiff’s 
fall.277  The fall and subsequent back pain were both noted in Mr. 
Massey’s chart, making it difficult for the plaintiff to prove that the 
defendant hid the severity of the fall.278  The court concluded that 
elder abuse requires more than negligence.279  Because the acts of 
the defendant were negligent at most, they were barred by the 
statute of limitations for professional negligence.280 
E. Court of Appeal, Fourth District 
The Court of Appeal, Fourth District, has cited Delaney in 
seventeen opinions, including twelve that are irrelevant to the 
comparison of professional negligence and elder abuse or 
neglect.281  The remaining five relevant opinions include three 
 
 274. Id. at 215. 
 275. Id. at 216. 
 276. Id. at 217. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id.  
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. at 216–17. 
 281. The irrelevant opinions are: Cotton v. StarCare Med. Grp., Inc., 107 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 767, 778 (Ct. App. 2010); Olsen v. N. Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., Nos. 
E041640, E045194, 2009 WL 3166639, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2009); 
Hammermueller v. N. Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., Nos. E041640, E045194, 
2008 WL 4684773, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2008); Oshiro v. All Nations 
Mission Church, No. E041323, 2008 WL 2082140, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. May 19, 
2008); McElroy v. Walsh, No. G038211, 2008 WL 2058169 (Cal. Ct. App. May 14, 
2008); Wedbush Morgan Secs., Inc. v. Wilson, No. D049974, 2007 WL 3298901, at 
*2 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2007); Hogan v. Country Villa Health Servs., 55 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 450, 456 (Ct. App. 2007); Abrahams v. Jacob Health Care Ctr., L.L.C., No. 
D046939, 2006 WL 2924841, at *6 n.13 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2006); Kuperman v. 
Assessment Appeals Bd. No. 1, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 703, 716 (Ct. App. 2006) (Aaron, 
J., concurring); Smith v. Ben Bennett, Inc., 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 612, 615 (Ct. App. 
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published and two unpublished opinions. 
In Marron v. Superior Court,282 summary judgment on behalf of 
the defendant, the Regents of the University of California, was 
vacated because deposition testimony sufficiently described reckless 
neglect of a dependent adult.283  The decedent, Ms. Lidia Marron, a 
forty-four-year-old dependent adult, had her middle colic vein 
perforated during a liver biopsy.284  She died four months later, 
after suffering multiple complications “including fungus infections 
in her blood and lungs, peritonitis, intra-abdominal and pelvic 
abscesses, sepsis syndrome, hypotension, fevers, abdominal pain 
and hemorrhaging.”285  The deposition testimony supporting a 
possible finding of reckless neglect on behalf of the nurses 
included evidence of feces soiling Ms. Marron’s bed for hours, a 
failure to bathe Ms. Marron despite her being soiled with blood 
and feces, not brushing Ms. Marron’s teeth to prevent fungus 
growing in her mouth, not assisting her to the bathroom despite 
her incontinent condition, and, during one hemorrhaging 
incident, not assisting “in putting pressure on the wound or 
sopping up the blood, thus requiring the family members who were 
present to attempt to control the bleeding on their own.”286  
Additionally, there was evidence that the hospital administration 
had received complaints from the nurses about inadequate staffing 
levels but failed to take remedial action.287   
In Norman v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc.,288 the court of 
appeal found that a nursing home’s failure to comply with 
regulations regarding fall prevention constituted negligence per 
se.289  The failure to comply with regulations was sufficiently related 
to the decedent’s multiple falls and her eventual death, so the lack 
of compliance constituted neglect under EADACPA.290  The court 
of appeal held that the trial court committed prejudicial error 
when it refused to instruct the jury on the doctrine of negligence 
 
2005); People v. Davis, 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 92, 101 (Ct. App. 2005); and Bitters v. 
Rutledge, No. E032427, 2003 WL 22701482, at *2 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 
2003). 
 282. 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358 (Ct. App. 2003). 
 283. Id. at 371. 
 284. Id. at 361. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. at 372 n.13. 
 287. Id at 371–72. 
 288. 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 765 (Ct. App. 2003). 
 289. Id. at 776–78. 
 290. Id. at 777. 
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per se, explaining that “[t]he doctrine of negligence per se does 
not apply only to professional negligence causes of action.  Rather, 
it generally can apply to any cause of action based on or involving 
negligence, including an elder abuse cause of action on a neglect 
theory.”291 
The final published case from the Fourth District, Community 
Care and Rehabilitation Center v. Superior Court,292 involved the same 
issue as Covenant Care, Inc.: whether Section 425.13(a) of the 
California Code of Civil Procedure requires application of 
heightened procedural requirements for EADACPA claims seeking 
punitive damages.293  The Fourth District answered in the 
affirmative, the opposite of the California Supreme Court in 2004 
in Covenant Care, Inc.; thus, Community Care and Rehabilitation Center 
is no longer good law.294 
In addition to the published cases, the Fourth District has two 
unpublished cases that cite Delaney regarding the relationship 
between professional negligence and elder abuse.  In Eichenberg v. 
San Diego Medical Services Enterprises, LLC,295 the court found that a 
medical transportation company that convinced a nurse to 
downgrade an elder’s transportation order from a gurney in an 
ambulance to a wheelchair van did not act in a reckless manner 
sufficient to sustain an elder neglect action because the evidence 
did not establish “a conscious and deliberate decision to place [the 
patient] in a high degree of risk.”296   
In Klinkner v. Alta Vista Health Care Center,297 the plaintiffs failed 
to plead sufficient facts to indicate that a nursing home’s acts and 
omissions were reckless, “with knowledge of or in conscious 
disregard of a high probability of serious danger to” the patient.298  
The patient had a pre-existing decubitus ulcer on her coccyx and 
suffered a badly dislocated hip in the facility.299  Although the court 
found that there were “numerous failures to provide her with 
proper care” the facts did “not indicate that Alta Vista acted with 
 
 291. Id. at 778. 
 292. 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 343 (Ct. App. 2000). 
 293. Id. at 344. 
 294. Id. at 349–50. 
 295. No. D049243, 2007 WL 4480735 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2007). 
 296. Id. at *7. 
 297. No. E037164, 2005 WL 3344801 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2005). 
 298. Id. at *6. 
 299. Id.  
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recklessness.”300 The court reasoned that there was: 
[N]o indication that any of Alta Vista’s alleged failures to 
provide Isabell with timely or appropriate care occurred 
over an extended period of time.  For example, 
allegations that Alta Vista allowed Isabell to lie in her own 
feces for “unreasonable amounts of time” and failed to 
maintain staffing levels adequate to meet her needs do 
not show that Alta Vista acted with a level of culpability 
exceeding negligence. . . . Plaintiffs’ reliance on 
Delaney . . . is misplaced.301 
F.  Court of Appeal, Fifth District 
The Court of Appeal, Fifth District, only has two cases that 
Keycite identifies as citing Delaney as authority: People v. Gahagan302 
and Estate of Morelli v. Eustice.303  Both cases are unpublished 
opinions.  People v. Gahagan includes a typographical error in a 
citation to People v. Buckhalter,304 which causes it to be incorrectly 
identified by Keycite as citing Delaney.  Estate of Morelli cites Delaney 
only tangentially in relation to a will contest involving undue 
influence and allegations of financial abuse.305  Neither case 
involves issues of professional negligence in comparison to elder 
abuse or neglect.  
G. Court of Appeal, Sixth District 
The Court of Appeal, Sixth District, has five opinions that cite 
Delaney.  Four of the five opinions, two published and two 
unpublished, are not relevant to the relationship of professional 
negligence and elder abuse.306  The other opinion, Intrieri v. Superior 
Court,307 is a published opinion that provides an in-depth analysis of 
 
 300. Id. at *7. 
 301. Id. 
 302. No. F055847, 2009 WL 2767757 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2009). 
 303. No. F046443, 2006 WL 1107599 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2006) . 
 304. Gahagan, 2009 WL 2767757, at *2. 
 305. Morelli, 2006 WL 1107599, at *12 n.13. 
 306. The irrelevant opinions are: Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Ctr., 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
222, 242 (Ct. App. 2006); Guardian N. Bay, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
748, 758 (Ct. App. 2001); Sempervirens Fund v. Fox (In re Conservatorship of Pers. 
& Estate of Collord), No. H027610, 2005 WL 1983893, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 
17, 2005); and Listman v. Listman, No. H021975, 2002 WL 194248, at *7 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Feb. 5, 2002). 
 307. 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 97 (Ct. App. 2004). 
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elder abuse committed by health care professionals.   
In Intrieri, Amalia Intrieri’s husband and son brought suit 
under EADACPA against Guardian Postacute Services, Inc.308  Ms. 
Intrieri was an Alzheimer’s patient who was pushed by a non-
Alzheimer’s patient, Janet Lawry, causing Ms. Intrieri to fall and 
break her hip.309  Ms. Intrieri died two months later.310   
The trial court’s entry of summary judgment for Guardian was 
reversed by the court of appeal as it found “triable questions of fact 
exist[ed] as to the reckless neglect element of the cause of action 
for elder abuse.”311  The court found that the Guardian staff was 
recklessly negligent in posting the keypad code above the keypad to 
the entrance of the Alzheimer’s unit, leaving Ms. Lawry “unfettered 
access” to the unit.312  This recklessness constituted a conscious 
disregard for the safety of Ms. Intrieri and other Alzheimer’s 
patients because Ms. Lawry was allowed to enter the Alzheimer’s 
unit and verbally abuse the patients without Guardian staff 
intervention, despite knowledge that Ms. Lawry was in a confused 
and hostile state—she already had threatened to kill a patient so 
she could leave the nursing home.313   
Additionally, after Ms. Intrieri’s surgery to repair her hip, the 
plaintiffs alleged that the nursing staff failed to follow a new care 
plan for treatment of Ms. Intrieri’s bed sores, leading to the 
amputation of her right toe, and eventually the amputation of her 
leg up to the knee.314  The court of appeal reversed the trial court, 
holding that there was sufficient evidence alleged of elder neglect 
for both the insufficient security as well as the pressure sores.315  
H. Federal Cases 
Three of the eight federal cases that cite Delaney are relevant 
and warrant a brief mention, although they are not appellate 
decisions and they will not be included in the final analysis.316  In 
 
 308. Id. at 100. 
 309. Id. 
 310. Id. at 101. 
 311. Id. at 108. 
 312. Id. at 107. 
 313. Id. at 107–08. 
 314. Id. at 108. 
 315. Id. at 107–08. 
 316. The other five irrelevant opinions are: Martinez v. Adams, No. CV F 09-
0899 LJO DLB, 2010 WL 892186, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2010); McGill v. 
Wachovia Mortg. FSB Loan, No. 2:09-cv-2002 FCD/GGH, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
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Hougue v. City of Holtville,317 a nursing home patient with 
Alzheimer’s escaped, prompting the nursing staff to call the police 
as they tried to follow him and bring him back to the facility.318  The 
police violently subdued the patient, severely damaging his left arm 
beyond repair.319  Applying California law, the federal trial court 
granted the nursing home’s motion to dismiss for abuse under 
EADACPA but refused to dismiss the neglect claims or the 
negligence claims.320   
In George v. Sonoma County Sheriff’s Department,321 a dependent 
adult with sickle cell anemia was returned from a hospital to a jail, 
where he died alone six days later, even though he was 
nonresponsive, incontinent, and bed-ridden.322  Several doctors 
allegedly transferred him back to jail because they thought he was 
malingering.323  In partially dismissing some of the claims, the trial 
court dismissed an elder abuse claim against one of the doctors, 
finding that there was insufficient evidence to show that he acted 
recklessly.324  Independently, the trial court also found that the 
complaint did not adequately allege that the doctor had “care or 
custody” of the patient sufficient to meet the definition of neglect 
under EADACPA.325   
In Von Mangolt Hills v. Intensive Air, Inc.,326 the federal trial 
court denied a motion to dismiss an elder neglect case where an air 
ambulance service left a patient on a gurney on an airport tarmac 
for half-an-hour when it was over 100°F.327  The court found that 
the sunburn and exposure to extreme heat constituted a breach of 
custodial care standards and refused to apply Section 425.13 of the 
California Code of Civil Procedure to the case.328  In sum, like the 
California trial courts, the federal courts look back to Delaney for 
 
43393, at *34 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2010); Quintero Family Trust v. OneWest Bank, 
F.S.B., No. 09-CV-1561-IEG (WVG), 2010 WL 392312, at *16 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 
2010); Cabral v. Cnty. of Glenn, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1194 (E.D. Cal. 2009); and 
Negrete v. Fid. & Guar. Life Ins. Co., 444 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1002 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
 317. No. 07cv2229 WQH (WMC), 2008 WL 1925249 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2008). 
 318. Id. at *1. 
 319. Id.  
 320. Id. at *5–7. 
 321. No. C-08-02675 EDL, 2009 WL 656299 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2009).  
 322. Id. at *2. 
 323. Id. 
 324. Id. at *6. 
 325. Id. 
 326. No. C06-03300 JSW, 2007 WL 521222 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2007). 
 327. Id. at *5. 
 328. Id. at *4. 
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guidance on finding abuse and neglect under EADACPA. 
I.  Summary 
Of the ninety-six opinions that cite Delaney, twenty-two are 
California Court of Appeal decisions that cite it regarding the 
delineation of professional negligence and elder abuse or neglect 
committed by health care professionals.  An additional five 
published opinions cite related issues of the applicability of 
punitive damages, statutes of limitations, and attorney fees 
standards of proof under section 15657, and were included in this 
article to give a fully rounded view of the statutory interpretation of 
section 15657. 
Of the court of appeal opinions, only six are published cases 
that squarely address the difference between professional 
negligence and elder abuse: Sababin from the Second District; Mack 
and Massey from the Third District; Marron and Norman from the 
Fourth District; and Intrieri from the Sixth District.  These decisions 
are indistinguishable from the sixteen unpublished opinions329 
addressing the same issue.  In eleven of the sixteen relevant 
unpublished opinions, the court sided with the defendant on 
appeal concerning the issue of imposition of elder abuse or neglect 
against a health care professional.  When considered as a whole, 
plaintiffs won ten of the twenty-two identified appellate cases, five 
published and five unpublished decisions.  Defendants won the 
remaining twelve cases. 
Nevertheless, of the six published cases, only Massey represents 
a victory for the defendant health care practitioner.330  Only Massey 
illuminates the other side of the line, examining actions that would 
likely have been found negligent but not abusive, had they not 
been barred by MICRA’s statute of limitations.331  Only Massey, and 
the five published opinions on the other side of the line, may be 
cited in California courts as authority.332 
 
 329. The unpublished version of Sababin is not included in this total as it was 
replaced by the published version. 
 330. See Massey v. Mercy Med. Ctr. Redding, 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 209, 211–12 (Ct. 
App. 2009). 
 331. See id. at 217. 
 332. See CAL. RULES OF COURT, R. 8.1115. 
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V. PRECEDENT AND THE CITATION OF UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS 
The citation of unpublished opinions has been a significant 
topic of interest since the release of Judge Richard Arnold’s 
decision in Anastasoff v. United States.333  In Anastasoff, Judge Arnold 
responded to the Internal Revenue Service lawyers’ citation of an 
unpublished Eighth Circuit mailbox rule decision, Christie v. United 
States,334 as authority, which he believed should have controlled his 
decision in Anastasoff.335  He held that the Eighth Circuit’s 
publication rule, Rule 28A(i), which allowed panels to declare 
some opinions like Christie “non-precedential” was unconstitutional 
under Article III of the United States Constitution because “it 
purports to confer on the federal courts a power that goes beyond 
the ‘judicial.’”336  Judge Arnold reasoned that “[i]nherent in every 
judicial decision is a declaration and interpretation of a general 
principle or rule of law,”337 and that the declarations of law are 
“authoritative to the extent necessary for the decision, and must be 
applied in subsequent cases to similarly situated parties.”338  He 
concluded that the declaration and interpretation of law and its 
subsequent application in similar cases forms the foundation of the 
doctrine of precedent that the founders intended the federal 
courts to follow when they wrote Article III.339   
In an en banc decision of the Eighth Circuit, also authored by 
Judge Arnold, Anastasoff was rendered moot, and thus vacated on 
procedural grounds because the Internal Revenue Service 
acquiesced to another circuit’s decision, and Faye Anastasoff was 
paid the full amount of her claim, plus interest.340  The 
constitutionality of the Eighth Circuit’s publication rule remained 
an open question as the underlying case was vacated. 
Many academic and judicial articles and lectures have drawn 
battle lines around the key question in Anastasoff: do the federal 
courts have the power to determine that some opinions have no 
precedential effect?341  Much like California, some federal circuits, 
 
 333. 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 334. No. 91-2375MN, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 38446 (8th Cir. Mar. 20, 1992) 
(per curiam). 
 335. See Anastoff, 223 F.3d at 899. 
 336. Id. 
 337. Id. at 899–900. 
 338. Id. at 900. 
 339. Id. 
 340. See Anastasoff v. United States, 235 F.3d 1054, 1056 (8th  Cir. 2000). 
 341. See, e.g., David R. Cleveland, Overturning the Last Stone: The Final Step in 
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notably the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, had publication rules that 
gave unpublished opinions no precedential weight, and then, as an 
extra measure, forbade the citation of unpublished opinions, 
except in limited circumstances involving res judicata and law of 
the case.342  But, unpublished decisions had risen to over eighty-four 
percent of all circuit decisions by 2006.343   
It may seem unnecessary to explore the Anastasoff debate in 
more detail, as the Federal Appellate Rules Committee 
spearheaded a rule to standardize the nation’s publication and 
citation rules—Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1—which 
went into effect on January 1, 2007.344  The rule prohibits federal 
courts from restricting the citation of federal judicial opinions, 
orders, judgments, or other written dispositions that have been 
“designated as ‘unpublished,’ ‘not for publication,’ ‘non-
precedential,’ ‘not precedent,’ or the like,” and which were issued 
on or after January 1, 2007.345  If a party cites such an unpublished 
opinion, they must file and serve a copy of the opinion if it is not 
available in a publicly accessible electronic database, such as a 
 
Returning Precedential Status to All Opinions, 10 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 61, 62 (2009) 
(“Do American courts have the authority to render decisions not binding on 
future courts, and, even if they do, should they issue such decisions?”); Patrick J. 
Schiltz, The Citation of Unpublished Opinions in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 27 (2005) (discussing “the simple question whether a litigant 
who submits a paper to, say, the Second Circuit may cite in that paper an 
unpublished opinion of the Second Circuit (or any other federal court).”); 
William M. Richman, Much Ado About the Tip of an Iceberg, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1723, 1724 (2005) (discussing proposed rule’s treatment of unpublished 
decisions); Martha Dragich Pearson, Citation of Unpublished Opinions as Precedent, 55 
HASTINGS L.J. 1235, 1236 (2004) (discussing precedential value of unpublished 
opinions); Robert A. Mead, “Unpublished” Opinions as the Bulk of the Iceberg: 
Publication Patterns in the Eighth and Tenth Circuits of the United States Courts of 
Appeals, 93 LAW LIBR. J. 589, 589 (2001) (examining “the debate regarding 
unpublished opinions in the federal courts.”); Danny J. Boggs & Brian P. Brooks, 
Unpublished Opinions and the Nature of Precedent, 4 GREEN BAG 2d 17, 18 (2000) 
(“The unpublished opinion is tolerated for reasons involving such pedestrian 
considerations as efficiency in judicial administration.”); Richard S. Arnold, 
Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 219, 219 (1999) 
(examining the effect of “opinions handed down by the federal courts of appeals 
are marked ‘Not To Be Published.’”). 
 342. For an excellent summary of the debate concerning Anastasoff and a list 
of each circuit and state publication and citation rule, circa 2002, see Steve 
Sheppard, The Unpublished Opinion Opinion: How Richard Arnold’s Anastasoff Opinion 
is Saving America’s Courts from Themselves, 2002 ARK. L. NOTES 85 (2002). 
 343. Cleveland, supra note 341, at 62. 
 344. FED. R. APP. P. 32.1. 
 345. Id. 
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circuit’s website.346  Nonetheless, some commentators have noted 
that this rule change does nothing to address Judge Arnold’s most 
important question: whether these unpublished decisions have any 
precedential value.347   
A. California’s Opinion Publication and Citation Rules 
Rule 976, the predecessor of California’s current publication 
and citation rule, was established in 1964,348 the same year the 
Federal Judicial Conference recommended federal publication of 
only opinions that had “general precedential value” because of the 
cost and difficulty of keeping up with the exponentially increasing 
size of case reporters.349  The 1966 California Constitution Revision 
Committee incorporated this concept of selected precedential 
value.350  Rule 976 prohibited the publication of opinions in the 
Official Reports unless the opinion:  
(1) [E]stablishes a new rule of law, applies an existing rule 
 
 346. Id. 
 347. Cleveland, supra note 341, at 62; J. Lyn Entrikin Goering, Legal Fiction of 
the “Unpublished” Kind: The Surreal Paradox of No-Citation Rules and the Ethical Duty of 
Candor, 1 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 27 (2005) (considering the then-proposed 
language to the rule). 
 348. Kenneth J. Schmier & Michael K. Schmier, Has Anyone Noticed the 
Judiciary’s Abandonment of Stare Decisis?, 7 J. L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 233, 239 (2005).  
The Schmier brothers are California activists against non-publication and, 
especially, citation prohibition rules.  They maintain a valuable website on the 
issue, www.nonpublication.com, where they reprint many of the articles and press 
clippings regarding the debate, especially in California.  THE COMMITTEE FOR THE 
RULE OF LAW, http://www.nonpublication.com. 
 349. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 1964, 11 (Government 
Printing Office 1964); see also CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 
RULES FOR PUBLICATION OF COURT OF APPEAL OPINIONS, REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS, 9 (Nov. 2006), http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/courts/supreme
/comm/documents/sc_report_12-7-06.pdf [hereinafter “REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS”] (“During the 1950’s, the courts annually produced an 
average of about 10 volumes of Court of Appeal opinions, with each volume 
averaging about two-thirds of the number of pages of modern volumes. This 
increased to an average of approximately 13 volumes a year in the early 1960’s. 
The increase in the number of volumes raised concerns that the bench and the 
bar were being inundated by the volume of Court of Appeal opinions.”). 
 350. Article VI, section 14 of the California Constitution provides in part: “The 
Legislature shall provide for the prompt publication of such opinions of the 
Supreme Court and courts of appeal as the Supreme Court deems appropriate, 
and those opinions shall be available for publication by any person.”  CAL. CONST. 
art. VI, § 14.   
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to a set of facts significantly different from those stated in 
the published opinions, or modifies or criticizes with 
reasons given, an existing rule; (2) resolves or creates an 
apparent conflict in the law; (3) involves a legal issue of 
continuing public interest; or (4) makes a significant 
contribution to legal literature by reviewing either the 
development of a common law rule or the legislative or 
judicial history of a provision of a constitution, statute, or 
other written law.351   
In 1977, Rule 977, the citation prohibition for unpublished 
opinions, was added to ensure a level playing field as some lawyers, 
such as district attorneys, had ready access to unpublished opinions 
due to the number of cases they collectively handled, whereas most 
lawyers did not.352 
California’s limited publication rule, combined with the 
almost unique depublication rule and the citation prohibition, led 
to significant rancor among some lawyers.353  Starting in 2000, 
members of the bar began approaching legislators to try to change 
the publication and citation rules.354  In response to legislative 
pressure, Chief Justice George of the California Supreme Court 
appointed an Advisory Committee in 2004 with the mandate to 
“review the rules for publication of Courts of Appeal opinions and 
recommend whether the rules should be changed to better ensure 
the publication of those opinions that may assist in the reasoned 
and orderly development of the law.”355   
In 2006, the California Supreme Court’s Advisory Committee 
on Rules for Publication of Court of Appeal Opinions released a 
report evaluating Rule 8.1105.356  The Committee was chaired by 
Associate Justice Kathryn Werdegar of the California Supreme 
Court and was comprised of six Associate Justices of the California 
courts of appeal, and six attorneys, including the principal attorney 
to the chief justice of the California Supreme Court and the 
 
 351. Schmier & Schmier, supra note 348, at 239 (citing CAL. RULES OF COURT R. 
976 (1996)). 
 352. Id.  
 353. Id., at 239–40; see also, Richard H. Cooper & David R. Fine, What’s Past is 
Prologue, 43 ORANGE COUNTY LAW. 25, 25 (Feb. 2001) (“The battle between the 
supporters and opponents of the rule is reaching a flash-point, and the outcome is 
by no means certain.”). 
 354. Cooper, supra note 353, at 27–28. 
 355. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 349, at 1, 5–6. 
 356. Id. at 1. 
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reporter of decisions of the California Supreme Court.357  The 
Advisory Committee was charged to “review the rules for the 
publication of Court of Appeal opinions and recommend whether 
the rules should be changed to better ensure the publication of 
those opinions that may assist in the reasoned and orderly 
development of the law.”358  Predictably, given the “insider” 
composition of the Advisory Committee, it only recommended 
modest changes to the rules.359 
Methodologically, the Advisory Committee examined the 
publication statistics of the courts of appeal and the experiences of 
other states and the federal courts.360  They also surveyed the 
justices of the courts of appeal and appellate attorneys concerning 
the publication rules.361  Eighty-six of the 101 justices of the courts 
of appeal responded to the survey.362  Instead of using a random 
sample of the California Bar, the Advisory Committee focused the 
survey towards attorneys and organizations with significant 
appellate practice, resulting in only about 300 responses.363   
Despite the potential for statistical skew with such a small 
sample, the results of the surveys are both interesting and 
troubling: 
Both the justices and the attorneys were asked whether 
they believe anything other than the rules—such as local 
traditions, standards, or practices—influences the court’s 
determination whether or not to certify an opinion for 
publication. . . . Although the great majority of justices 
stated that nothing other than the publication rules 
influences their determinations, 20 percent indicated that 
other factors may influence their decisions. This finding 
was consistent statewide; there were no statistically 
significant differences in the responses received from the 
districts. Other factors cited by the justices included that 
 
 357. Id. at iii–iv. 
 358. Id. at 1. 
 359. The Committee even prohibited outsiders from attending their meetings. 
Schmier & Schmier, supra note 348, at 243. 
 360. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 349, at 19. 
 361. Id.at 32. 
 362. Id. at 7, 32. 
 363. Id. at 33.  The lack of participation by trial court litigants and judges 
makes these results much less reliable.  See J. Thomas Sullivan, Unpublished Opinions 
and No Citation Rules in the Trial Courts, 47 ARIZ. L REV. 419 (2005) (arguing that 
trial court judges and attorneys have frequent need to access the analysis found in 
unpublished decisions and are put into dangerous ethical quandaries by no-
citation rules). 
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the case involves a recurring issue, concern about 
criticizing an attorney or trial judge, and the pressure of 
workload. In contrast, a majority of attorneys—56 
percent—believed that factors other than the publication 
rules have an influence on the justices’ publication 
decisions. Factors that the attorneys suggested influence 
the courts’ determination of whether to publish included 
encouraging or avoiding scrutiny or review and a panel’s 
or district’s preference regarding publication frequency.  
The attorneys were also asked whether they believe the 
publication rules are uniformly followed. Here too, the 
majority of attorneys—67 percent—believed that the 
publication rules are not uniformly followed.364 
In addition to the appellate bar’s skepticism about the bench’s 
adherence to the opinion publication guidelines, ninety-two 
percent of bar respondents stated that they used unpublished 
opinions in their practice.365  Even more surprisingly: 
Fifty-eight percent of the justices stated that they have 
relied on unpublished opinions when drafting opinions.  
Most of these justices indicated that they do so in order to 
consider the rationale or analysis used in a similar 
decision or to ensure consistency with their own prior 
rulings as well as those within their district or division.  
Some justices also use unpublished opinions as a source of 
boilerplate language.366 
Nevertheless, when asked whether parties should be allowed to 
draw the supreme court’s attention to an unpublished opinion, 
only twenty-eight percent of the justices of the courts of appeals 
said yes, as compared to sixty-seven percent of the bar.367  
Apparently, the justices of the courts of appeal wanted it both 
ways—they wanted the guidance garnered from unpublished 
opinions without the threat of having others draw attention to 
them through citation. 
Despite the admission of most of the justices of the courts of 
appeal that they rely on unpublished opinions, the Advisory 
Committee found that “by and large, the current publication rules 
and practices have been successful in creating and managing an 
accessible body of precedential appellate opinions that provide 
 
 364. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 349, at 38–39. 
 365. Id. at 41. 
 366. Id. 
 367. Id. at 41–42. 
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useful guidance for litigants and the public.”368  It eventually 
recommended that the supreme court revise Rule 8.1105 to 
include a presumption in favor of publication if a court of appeal 
finds one of the following factors: 
Rule 8.1105 
(c) Standard for certification 
An opinion of a Court of Appeal or a superior court 
appellate division—whether it affirms or reverse a trial 
court order or judgment—should be certified for 
publication in the Official Reports if the opinion: 
(1) Establishes a new rule of law; 
(2) Applies an existing rule of law to a set of facts 
significantly different from those stated in published 
opinions; 
(3) Modifies, explains, or criticizes with reasons 
given, an existing rule of law; 
(4) Advances a new interpretation, clarification, 
criticism, or construction of a provision of a 
constitution, statute, ordinance, or court rule; 
(5) Addresses or creates an apparent conflict in the 
law; 
(6) Involves a legal issue of continuing public 
interest; 
(7) Makes a significant contribution to legal 
literature by reviewing either the development of a 
common law rule or the legislative or judicial history 
of a provision of a constitution, statute, or other 
written law; 
(8) Invokes a previously overlooked rule of law, or 
reaffirms a principle of law not applied in a recently 
reported decision; or 
(9) Is accompanied by a separate opinion concurring 
or dissenting on a legal issue, and publication of the 
majority and separate opinions would make a 
significant contribution to the development of the 
law.369 
The Advisory Committee also recommended that the supreme 
court list the factors that should not be considered by the courts of 
appeal when deciding whether to publish an opinion: “Factors such 
 
 368. Id. at 1. 
 369. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 349, at 57, 59.  
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as the workload of the court, or the potential embarrassment of a 
litigant, lawyer, judge, or other person should not affect the 
determination of whether to publish an opinion.”370  The supreme 
court accepted and implemented both recommendations.371  The 
Advisory Committee did not recommend modifying the 
unpublished opinion citation prohibition rule, which currently 
reads: 
Rule 8.1115. Citation of opinions 
(a) Unpublished opinion 
Except as provided in (b), an opinion of a California 
Court of Appeal or superior court appellate division that 
is not certified for publication or ordered published must 
not be cited or relied on by a court or a party in any other 
action. 
(b) Exceptions 
An unpublished opinion may be cited or relied on: 
(1) When the opinion is relevant under the doctrines 
of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; 
or  
(2) When the opinion is relevant to a criminal or 
disciplinary action because it states reasons for a 
decision affecting the same defendant or respondent 
in another such action.  
(c) Citation procedure 
A copy of an opinion citable under (b) or of a cited 
opinion of any court that is available only in a computer-
based source of decisional law must be furnished to the 
court and all parties by attaching it to the document in 
which it is cited or, if the citation will be made orally, by 
letter within a reasonable time in advance of citation. 
(d) When a published opinion may be cited 
A published California opinion may be cited or relied on 
as soon as it is certified for publication or ordered 
published.372 
The Advisory Committee’s efforts in expanding the 
publication rule may produce more published EADACPA opinions 
in the future, but only one recent opinion, Massey, has been 
released for publication by any of the courts of appeal.  Unless Rule 
 
 370. Id. at 59. 
 371. See CAL. RULES OF COURT, R. 8.1105. 
 372. Id. R. 8.1115. 
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8.1115 is relaxed to allow attorneys to cite or argue the 
unpublished opinions, which fifty-eight percent of the surveyed 
justices of the courts of appeal admit they are already using while 
drafting opinions,373 California is in danger of continuing to 
muddle the interpretation of EADACPA. 
B. Impact of Unpublished Opinions on EADACPA 
The twenty-two cases that directly address the Delaney 
distinction between professional negligence and elder abuse are 
complicated as far as their details, but broad generalizations 
emerge upon close inspection.  First, cases that involve missed 
diagnosis such as Trengali, Marchesano, and Doepke are likely to be 
deemed professional negligence rather than elder abuse.  
Diagnosis is at the heart of the practice of medicine.  Categorizing 
missed diagnoses as a negligent mistake rather than a reckless 
disregard for the patient is relatively easy.  These decisions are all 
unpublished and were decided within a few years of Delaney.  
Perhaps the appellate panels that wrote these decisions were 
unwilling to publish decisions that openly distinguished the facts in 
those cases from Delaney, but by failing to publish, they deprived 
the health care industry of precedent for use in cases where the 
allegations suggest traditional medical malpractice analyses.   
Next, cases that involve patterns of failure to treat known 
injuries or illnesses, such as Sababin, Mack, Norman, Marron, Intrieri, 
Hubbard, Camacho, Gibson, Trujillo, and Leong are likely to have been 
decided for the plaintiffs, and about half were published.  The 
unpublished cases in this category are similar enough to the 
published cases that the only rationale as to why they were not all 
published is that the unpublished cases are, on average, newer than 
the published ones, thus suggesting that the appellate panels are 
finding that the facts are no longer significantly different enough 
from the previous cases to warrant publication.  If this is the case, 
the panels are glossing over the possibility that the specific actions 
of the physicians and nurses are different enough that future courts 
could factually distinguish cases if the cases were published.   
Finally, cases where health care professionals made isolated 
harmful decisions, such as the dropped patient in Reyome, the 
wrong transportation methodology in Eichenberg, and the fall 
followed by the unauthorized pain killer in Massey are likely to be 
 
 373. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 349, at 41. 
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decided for the defendants, and, with the exception of Massey, 
unlikely to be published.  This makes some sense in light of the 
error-correcting function of the courts of appeal.  There is little 
public policy at stake when an employee simply used bad judgment 
and committed malpractice or another form of negligence.  To 
dispose of these cases with an unpublished decision is a quick, 
effective course of action for the panel.  This does not explain why 
the panel thought to publish Massey when no other panel had 
decided to publish a case where the defendants had won on the 
elder abuse action. 
Two other elder abuse legal scholars have commented on the 
relative lack of published precedent that interprets or applies 
EADACPA.  Seymour Moskowitz, a law professor at Valparaiso Law 
School, explains the over-arching reasons for the lack of EADACPA 
case law: 
Outside the institutional context, i.e., nursing homes and 
hospitals, few cases employing civil tort or EADACPA 
remedies may be found in the published California 
reports.  I suspect a variety of reasons are responsible for 
this lack of precedent.  Recovery is often unfeasible 
against perpetrators, whether family or third parties, who 
are judgment proof or have limited resources.  Elder 
abuse is often hidden; wrongful behavior is rarely revealed 
to those outside the family circle.  Parents often fail to 
report maltreatment because of the “shame and stigma of 
having to admit they raised such a child. . . .  Instead they 
react with denial, psychological acquiescence, and passive 
acceptance.  Fear and illness also deter participation in 
the legal process.  Often, the victim and the abuser are in 
a mutually dependent relationship, and the victim has no 
other caretaker.374 
Thus, based on a careful search for EADACPA cases using 
LexisNexis, Professor Moskowitz contends that few non-nursing 
home elder abuse cases are published in California.375  A case 
against a physician or other health professional for abusive 
behavior in an institution is more likely to draw attention than the 
common abuse that is perpetrated in private homes by family 
 
 374. Seymour Moskowitz, Golden Age in the Golden State: Contemporary Legal 
Developments in Elder Abuse and Neglect, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 589, 607–08 (2003) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 375. Id. at 607 n.94. 
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members or friends.376  In addition to being potential—albeit 
relatively infrequent—perpetrators of elder abuse, physicians as a 
group are unreliable as mandatory reporters of elder abuse; thus, 
they are not as effective as they could be in helping to decrease 
such abuse.377 
Within the context of nursing home litigation, where most of 
the non-financial abuse EADACPA cases are found, Bryan Carney, a 
nursing home defense lawyer, quietly critiques the lack of 
published decisions: 
A series of published and nonpublished opinions since 
Delaney have begun to give a judicial gloss to the term 
“elder abuse.”  After 16 years of experience with enhanced 
remedies for elder abuse, “reckless neglect” has become 
the favorite (and the most frequently litigated) species of 
elder abuse.  More importantly, courts are using 
nonstatutory markers to draw the line between elder 
abuse and professional negligence—namely, the length of 
time that the elder is exposed to abuse or neglect and 
what the healthcare provider knew about the elder’s 
condition during that time.  No opinion expressly claims 
these two factors are dispositive, but a fair reading of 
published and unpublished cases strongly suggests that 
these two factors decide the difference between statutory 
elder abuse and simple, common law negligence.378 
Additionally, he notes “Klinkner and Trujillo are unpublished, 
but they offer some insight into how the courts look at the period 
of alleged mistreatment to determine whether the lawsuit is one for 
elder abuse or negligence.”379  Finally, he concludes, perhaps as 
loudly as he finds prudent, that: 
Two published cases illustrate how concealing or ignoring 
an elder’s condition may constitute elder abuse.  But no 
published case defines the goalpost at the opposite end of 
the field—namely, when will a defendant’s knowledge (or 
lack of knowledge) of an elder’s condition not be 
sufficient to support a claim of elder abuse?  On that side 
of the question, little guidance exists.  The cases are 
 
 376. See id. at 608 (offering several reasons why family member abuse may be 
reported at a lower rate than institutional abuse). 
 377. See id. at 611 (discussing the evidence of the infrequency of mandatory 
reporting).   
 378. Carney, supra note 17, at 44. 
 379. Id. at 45. 
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unpublished.380  
In 2009, Massey began the process of defining the goalpost 
opposite Delaney and Mack, but Massey is barely adequate in that it 
does not address the situation where there was a particularly 
gruesome and long-lasting period of suffering, such as Renko.381  
Renko, from a defense perspective, would have been a useful case to 
have had published as it addresses the question of culpability within 
the context of a case with similar outcomes to Delaney, Mack, and 
Marron.  Defense attorneys, however, are prohibited by Rule 8.1115 
from citing Renko or Trengali for almost any reason.382 
EADACPA cases are published at a much higher rate—27 
percent for the twenty-two case sample—than the historic 
publication rate of 7.4 percent.383  Nevertheless, there is little 
justification for not publishing most or all of the EADACPA cases, 
even before the standards were relaxed in 2007.  EADACPA was 
passed in response to high levels of elder and dependent adult 
abuse in society.384  It should be viewed, in almost every instance, as 
involving “a legal issue of continuing public interest.”385  
Additionally, the new Rule 8.1105(c)(9) will require publication of 
close cases like Trujillo, where a dissenting justice rejects the 
majority’s view of professional negligence and elder abuse.386  
Perhaps the most important reason for publishing EADACPA 
decisions is rooted in the reasons underlying Rule 8.1105(c)(2), 
which “[a]pplies an existing rule of law to a set of facts significantly 
different from those stated in published opinions.”387   
As Mr. Carney explained, most of the EADACPA cases involve 
questions of the duration of the abusive or neglectful behavior, and 
the knowledge, or lack thereof, held by the health care 
professionals regarding the treatment of the elder or dependent 
 
 380. Id. 
 381. Compare Massey v. Mercy Med. Ctr. Redding, 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 209 (Ct. 
App. 2009), with Renko v. Northridge Care Ctr., Inc., Nos. B173512, 175474, 2005 
WL 2045352 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2005). 
 382. Carney, supra note 17 at 44; see also CAL. RULES OF COURT, R. 8.1105. 
 383. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 349, at 16 (giving average 
publication rate for the courts of appeal of 7.4 percent for the period 1999–2005). 
 384. Stafford, supra note 9, at 704. 
 385. CAL. RULES OF COURT, R. 8.1105(c)(6). 
 386. See id. (noting that an appellate decision should  be certified for 
publication if it “[i]s accompanied by a separate opinion concurring or dissenting 
on a legal issue, and publication of the majority and separate opinions would 
make a significant contribution to the development of the law.”). 
 387. Id.  
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adult.388  There are not yet enough cases delineating the standards 
of these two common law criteria for either the bench or the bar to 
have a clear idea of what constitutes too long a duration, or too 
much knowledge of wrongdoing held by a health care practitioner.  
The five days Ms. Reyes suffered in Trujillo contrast sharply with the 
four or five weeks that Ms. Trengali suffered in Trengali; in Trujillo 
the decedent’s son recovered because the health care practitioner 
failed to provide care resulting in death by infection, whereas in 
Trengali, the decedent’s children did not, because the nurses failed 
to inform the physician of Ms. Trengali’s deteriorating condition.389   
The distinction between the cases is simply not clear.  In 
situations like this, the courts of appeal should publish all of the 
EADACPA cases rather than falling back on what looks like a 
reluctance to hurt elders or nursing homes by publishing cases with 
complicated facts.  Instead of trying to manage the development of 
the case law, the courts of appeal, as an error-correcting court, 
should release all but the most prosaic of EADACPA opinions for 
publication, so that enough cases with significantly different facts 
can further outline the contours of professional negligence versus 
elder abuse and neglect committed by health care professionals. 
The standard response from intermediate courts to such a 
challenge is that non-judges do not understand the enormous time 
and resources required to publish more opinions.390  The Advisory 
Committee contended: 
California is virtually unique in its constitutional 
requirement that decisions by Courts of Appeal that 
determine causes “shall be in writing with reasons stated.”  
All other jurisdictions surveyed, except the State of 
Washington, provide intermediate appellate courts with 
some discretion to decide causes on appeal summarily, 
without issuing opinions in writing and stating the 
 
 388. Carney, supra note 17, at 44. 
 389. Compare Trujillo v. Superior Court of Los Angeles Cnty., No. B155860, 
2002 WL 1558830 (Cal. Ct. App. July 16, 2002), with Trengali v. N. Cal. 
Presbyterian Homes, Inc. No. A094106, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4742 (Ct. 
App. Jan. 18, 2002). 
 390. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski, In Opposition to Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 32.1, 51 FED. LAW. 36, 37 (2004) (“[T]he proposed rule would make 
more difficult our job of keeping the law of the circuit clear and consistent, 
increase the burden on the judges of our lower courts, make law practice more 
difficult and expensive, and impose colossal disadvantages on weak and poor 
litigants.”). 
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reasons.391  
In the twenty-two opinions squarely relevant to the inquiry in 
this article, the time pressure argument is unpersuasive.  The 
twenty-two cases are fundamentally similar.  All but a few of the 
cases address relatively gruesome medical experiences suffered by 
nursing home residents in the last weeks or months of their lives.  
The cases are of similar length, with an average of 6583.3 words for 
the six published cases and 6302.1 words for the sixteen 
unpublished cases.392  They cite similar cases, including Delaney.   
The stakes are high for litigators to have their appellate case 
published.  The Advisory Committee reported that:  
Of the approximately 92 percent of cases overall that were 
not certified for publication, only one-tenth of 1 percent 
resulted in opinions issued by the Supreme Court. Of the 
approximately 8 percent of cases in which the opinion 
had been certified for publication, about 7 percent 
resulted in a Supreme Court opinion.393   
Practically, without a published decision, access to an appeal to 
the supreme court is nearly impossible, thus giving potential 
credence to the suspicion that the courts of appeal shield decisions 
from review through non-publication of opinions.394  With all but 
one of the twelve cases where the defendant was successful in an 
EADACPA appeal remaining unpublished, a cynic could contend 
that that the courts of appeal, consciously or unconsciously, shields 
the health care industry from reversal in the supreme court by 
choosing not to publish decisions in which the industry wins.  
 
 391. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 349, at 14 (citing CAL. CONST. 
art. VI, § 14). 
 392. Bulk words is a relatively meaningless way to measure cases, but it goes to 
the heart of one justification for unpublished cases—that published decisions take 
longer to write.  Of the twenty-two cases examined, there is no discernable 
difference in content between the published and unpublished decisions.  The two 
longest decisions, Pagarigan and Renko, at 17,096 and 13,290 words respectively, 
are much longer than Norman, the longest published decision.  If these two outlier 
opinions are dropped from the pool of unpublished decisions, the average length 
is 5,302 words, which is still only 19.5 percent shorter than the average published 
opinion.  In this closed universe of cases, there is nothing to suggest that the 
published opinions took longer to write than the unpublished opinions.  This 
quantitative analysis should not be extrapolated to others areas of law without a 
similar, careful research process.  While this article critiques California’s 
publication and citation prohibition rules, it does so within the context of a very 
narrow scope of inquiry. 
 393. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 349, at 19. 
 394. Schmier & Schmier, supra note 348, at 250. 
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While non-publication of defense victories may be tactically 
beneficial to the defendants in a particular case, the California 
Medical Association routinely petitions the appellate courts to 
publish successful cases.395 
VI. CONCLUSION 
There is a simple, first step toward resolving the muddling 
impact that Rules 8.1105 and 8.1115 have on EADACPA: follow the 
trend of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and allow 
lawyers, justices, and judges to openly read and cite unpublished 
decisions as persuasive authority but not controlling precedent.  
Because of article VI, section 14 of the California Constitution, 
which allows the supreme court to publish the opinions of the 
supreme court and courts of appeal that it “deems appropriate” 
and requires the appellate courts to determine causes “in writing 
with reasons attached,”396 California is in a significantly different 
position than the federal judiciary post-Anastasoff in regard to the 
constitutionality of selective publication.397  The California Supreme 
Court may simply be unwilling to give up this clear constitutional 
mandate and adopt universal publication. 
Nevertheless, the middle ground solution of allowing citation 
to non-published opinions would likely address many of the 
current complaints.398  First, ending the citation prohibition would 
 
 395. See Health Policy in the Courts, CAL. MED. ASS’N (Jan. 2007), 
http://www.cmanet.org/member/upload/Acdept-cas.pdf (noting the California 
Medical Association’s unsuccessful attempts to get cases such as Marron and 
Norman depublished, and Reyome and Marchesano published). 
 396. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 14. 
 397. See Schmier v. Supreme Court, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d  580, 584 (Ct. App. 2000) 
(“The broad constitutional and legislative authority granting the Supreme Court 
selective publication discretion manifests a policy that California’s highest court, 
with its supervisory powers over lower courts, should oversee the orderly 
development of decisional law, giving due consideration to such factors as (a) ‘the 
expense, unfairness to many litigants, and chaos in precedent research,’ if all 
Court of Appeal opinions were published, and (b) whether unpublished opinions 
would have the same precedential value as published opinions.” (quoting People 
v. Valenzuela, 35 Cal. Rptr. 314, 322 (Ct. App. 1978))). 
 398. For more analysis regarding citation prohibition rules, see Lee Faircloth 
Peoples, Controlling the Common Law: A Comparative Analysis of No-Citation Rules and 
Publication Practices in England and the United States, 17 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
307 (2007); Goering, supra note 347, at 27; and Stephen R. Barnett, No-Citation 
Rules Under Siege: A Battlefield Report and Analysis, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 473, 487 
(2003) (reporting that a number of states discarded citation prohibitions since 
2001, showing an “increasing recognition by state courts that they can make their 
opinions citable without impairing performance of their judicial function. The sky 
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give permission to the courts of appeal to do what most justices are 
already doing in complicated matters such as medical negligence 
and abuse of nursing home residents, which is to check the 
decisions of other panels for persuasive authority.  Second, ending 
the citation prohibition would end the appearance of bias brought 
about by suspicions that the courts of appeal use unpublished 
decisions to avoid review.  Physicians in California already have an 
extremely low regard for the judicial system, which threatens the 
pool of available physicians willing to work as attending physicians 
in nursing homes and other care facilities.399  A less facially arbitrary 
system for deciding which EADACPA cases are precedential may 
decrease the distrust, but allowing at least citation to helpful 
unpublished cases with similar facts would likely seem less 
suspicious.  Finally, ending the citation prohibition would limit the 
gamesmanship of the bar regarding post-decision appeals for 
publication and depublication based on trying to create helpful 
legal climates for future cases.   
California’s elders and dependent adults, and their families, 
along with the health care practitioners who serve them, deserve a 
clear, rational explanation of the meaning of recklessness and 
neglect in order to be able to evaluate care and make wise choices 




does not fall.”). 
 399. Kapp, supra note 141, at 275. 
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